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THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL IN
CORPORATE LAW
PETER V, LETSOU *
Appraisal statutes give objecting shareholders the option to sell
their shares back to the corporation for "fair value" following certain
fundamental corporate changes. Although the specifics of appraisal
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most state appraisal statutes
share several basic features: they confer appraisal rights upon share-
holders who object to transactions such as mergers and consolidations,
sales of all, or substantially all, the corporation's assets (other than in
connection with dissolutions) and "serious" charter amendments, such
as those altering the purposes for which the corporation is organized;'
they define "fair value" as the value of the shares prior to giving effect
to the transaction from which the shareholders dissent; 2 and they
include a "market out" that withdraws appraisal rights when the objec-
tors' shares are publicly traded, 3
* Professor of Law & Director, Center for Corporate Law, University of Cincinnati College
of Law. BA., Harvard University, 1983; ID., University of Chicago, 1986, I would like to thank
Barry E. Adler, Lloyd R. Cohen, Geoffrey P, Miller, David A. Skeel, Robert B. Thompson, and
participants at the 1997 Annual Meeting of Canadian Law and Economics Association for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
I See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(6) (1997); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02
(1985); 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.21, at
299 (American Law Inst. 1994) [hereinafter' PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. The
comments to section 7.21 of the PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE report that statutes in
all American jurisdictions authorize a right of appraisal for dissenters to certain mergers and
consolidations; statutes in at least 46 jurisdictions provide for appraisal on a sale of substantially
all corporate assets; and at least 25 jurisdictions grant appraisal in the event of specified amend-
ments to the corporate charter. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra, § 7.21, com-
ment a, at 301.
2 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h); REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(3). The
comment to section 13.01 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act indicates that the
majority of state appraisal statutes adhere to the goal of preserving shareholders' prior lights as
shareholders. But cf. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Supra Dole 1, § 7.22(c) (stating
that, in certain corporate combinations, a "cum' may include a ptoportionate share of any gain
reasonably to be expected to result how the combination, unless special circumstances would
make such an allocation um easonable").
3 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1). Professor Thompson reports that, as of 1995,
"[a]bout hall' the states (covering the great majority of public corporations) ... [withdrew]
appraisal if the corporation's stock [was] traded on a stock exchange or [was] held by 2000
shareholders." Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corpo-
rate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 29 & li.114 (1995) (citing 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.01 (3d ed.
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Traditionally, commentators viewed appraisal rights as necessary
to protect shareholders who object to fundamental changes from being
forced to invest in "new" firms against their Bayless Manning,
however, challenged this traditional view of appraisal, as a remedy
necessary to protect shareholders from the effects of fundamental
change, in his famous 1962 essay on the remedy.' He argued that the
traditional view of appraisal had to be flawed because appraisal statutes
were not broad enough to achieve that goal.' In this regard, Manning
observed that, although appraisal statutes applied to some fundamen-
tal changes brought on by shareholders and directors (e.g., mergers
and charter amendments), they did not apply to all shareholder- or
director-approved changes that might be characterized as fundamen-
tal,7
 nor did they apply to any fundamental changes brought on by
creditors, customers, suppliers or others outside the firm.' From these
observations, Manning concluded that drafters of appraisal statutes
were not concerned with "an economic problem or with economic
solutions, "9 but were merely concerned with "solv[ing) a purely con-
ceptual need [under the nineteenth century view of corporations as
things that lived and died]—to provide something for the shareholder
who was about to undergo a legal trauma—a trauma deemed compen-
sable regardless of its economic consequences upon him."'° Manning
therefore left his readers with a challenge: articulate a meaningful
economic function for appraisal or reject the remedy as a vestige of an
outdated view of the corporation."
1985)); see alsoJoel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASII. L. REV. 829, 835
n.21 (1984) (reporting that in 1982, 73% of U.S. corporations were incorporated in one of the
25 states including a stock market exception to the appraisal process). The drafters of the Revised
Model Bus. Corp. Act, however, rejected a "market out," See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPO-
RATION ACT § 13.02, as did the drafters of the ALL'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
SEC supra note 1, § 7.21 & comment d.
4 See, e.g., NOFLVIAN d. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 591 (2d ed. 1971); see also
Thompson, supra note 3, at 18-19 & mi.77-78 (citing cases espousing traditional vices).
5 See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE
L.J. 223 (1962).
6 See id. at 241-43.
7 See id. For example, Manning noted that appraisal rights applied to transactions in which
a corporation sells all or substantially all its shares to another, but not to transactions where a
corporation buys all or substantially all of the assets of another.
See id. For instance, Manning noted that appraisal rights were not triggered by crippling
labor strikes or national calamities, even though such events could have dramatic consequences
for a firm or its shareholders.
Id. at 242.
I° Manning, supra note 5, at 246-47 (emphasis in original). Manning's explanation for the
adoption of appraisal statutes is discussed infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
liManning acknowledged that eliminating appraisal probably was not politically feasible. See
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Several commentators have taken up Manning's challenge to ex-
plain appraisal rights, most notably Professor Fischel,'' Professors
Kanda and Levmore,' 3 and Professor Gilson." For the most part, these
commentators have argued that the appraisal remedy should be viewed
as a check on misconduct by managers and controlling shareholders.
But their efforts have fallen short for three principal reasons. First,
each of the theories proposed by these commentators conflicts with
one or more of the basic features of the appraisal remedy (such as the
triggering provisions or the valuation rules). Second, none explains
the evolution of the appraisal remedy over time, particularly the intro-
duction and expansion of the market out.'s Third, none of these
theories carves out for appraisal a function that is distinct from that
served by other corporate law remedies, such as the shareholders'
action for breach of fiduciary duty.
This article offers a new "preference reconciliation" theory of
appraisal which overcomes these problems. This theory focuses on the
capacity of appraisal rights to reconcile differing shareholder prefer-
ences with respect to corporate transactions that alter the risk of the
firm's shares.I 6 As the discussion below explains, when shareholders
id. at 262. He them cram recommended limiting appraisal to the extent possible through adoption
of the market out. See id. at 260-62. Manning's call for a market out was widely accepted, see
supra note 3, though not everyone agreed with his criticism of appraisal. See, e.g., MELVIN A.
EISENBERG, TIIE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, ch. 7 (1976). Ernest Folk, the reporter for
the Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee which prepared the major 1967 revision of
the Delaware General Corporation Law, echoed Manning's criticism of appraisal. Folk wrote that
"[m]uddled theory and inconsistent treatment has always been characteristic of the appraisal
light in all jurisdictions: a few u -ansactions have been singled out to trigger cash payment rights,
although other events in corporate life, often more drastic in the impact, create no such right."
EILNEST FOLK, REPORT ON DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 196 (1968). The Report therefore
recommended that "the traditional appraisal right should be substantially abolished in Delaware"
by, "as a minimum, dropping cash•for-dissenters with respect to shares listed on any exchange or
subject to the expanded jurisdiction of the S.E.C. under the Securities Act Amendments of 1964."
Id. at 196, 198; see also Folk, lie Facto Mergers in Delaware: Harito ► v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 49
VA. L. REV, 1261 (1963) (setting forth in full Folk's argument for substantially abolishing appraisal
rights).
12 See Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J.
875.
13 See Hicield Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law,
32 UCLA L. REV, 429 (1985).
"See RONALD J. GILSON 8c BEILNARD S. BLACK, TIIE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
AcQuismoNs 714-22 (2d ed. 1995). The explanation of the appraisal remedy in the Gilson and
Black casebook is attributed only to Professor Gilson because it originally appeared in the
casebook's first edition, which was written by Gilson alone. See RONALD J. GILSON, TICE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 573-80 (1986).
13 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16 "Risk" refers to the extent to which a seem ity's returns cams be expected to vary over time.
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lack effective access to capital markets, risk-altering transactions (par-
ticularly those that alter the firm's market risk)" can make some share-
holders better off, while leaving others worse off.'s Appraisal rights
require the corporation to compensate shareholders who may be
harmed by such transactions and place the net costs of providing that
compensation on shareholders who otherwise gain.i 9 As a result, share-
holders who gain from appraisal triggering transactions will only vote
in favor of those transactions if their gains more than offset the net
costs of compensating objectors. Appraisal rights therefore decrease
the probability of risk-altering transactions that result in net losses to
shareholders, causing all shares to trade at higher prices ex ante."
The analysis that follows is divided into three parts. Part I exam-
ines and criticizes the principal post-Manning efforts to explain ap-
praisal. Part II explores in greater detail the preference reconciliation
theory of appraisal, including the ability of that theory to explain the
structure and evolution of appraisal statutes. Part III explores the main
implications of the new theory for the future development of appraisal
statutes.
I. PREVIOUS EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN APPRAISAL
This Part examines three previous attempts to solve the appraisal
puzzle posed by Manning. It focuses on (1) Fischel's 1983 paper, The
Risk comes in two forms: (1) market, systematic, or undiversifiable risk, which refers to the sensitivity
of the security's returns to movements in the market as a whole; and (2) unique, unsystematic, or
diversifiable risk, which refers to the sensitivity of the security's returns to firm-specific events (i,e.,
perils which are peculiar to the particular company). See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 156 & iiii.14-15 (5th ed. 1996).
17 For a definition of market risk, see supra note 16.
18 Transactions that alter a firm's unique risk will not ordinarily have any impact on investors
because investors can eliminate the unique risk associated with a particular security by holding
a diversified portfolio of investments. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 16, at 160. So most
investors care only about transactions which alter the firm's market risk (i.e., the firm's sensitivity
to movements in the market as a whole). But some investors ate precluded from fully diversifying
their investment portfolios because they arc required by practical or legal considerations to invest
a substantial portion of their wealth in a small number of companies. These investors will be
affected by changes in unique risk, as well as by changes in market risk.
19 As is explained infra, the cost of compensating objectors is equal to the excess of: (a) the
value of the claims the corporation must issue to obtain the cash necessary to compensate
objectors; over (b) the value of the shares that the objectors sell to the corporation.
2°The capacity of appraisal rights to protect shareholders from the effects of risk-altering
transactions was noted by Professor Macintosh in his excellent article on Canadian appraisal
rights. See Jeffrey G. Macintosh, The Shareholders' Appraisal Rights in Canada: A Critical Reap-
praisa4 24 OSCOODE HALL L.J. 201,209-10 (1986). But Professor Macintosh fails to note the link
between appraisal rights, on the one hand, and voting behavior by shareholders, on the other. It
is through this link that appraisal rights serve their primary purpose of reducing the ex ante risk
of uunsactions that result in net losses to shareholders,
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Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law;'' (2) Kanda and Levmore's 1985
paper, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Laur,22 and
(3) Gilson's discussion of the de facto merger doctrine in The Law and
Finance of Corporate Acquisitions. 22 The analysis presented in this Part
concludes that none of these works adequately explains the appraisal
remedy.
A. Fischel's Wealth Appropriation Theory
Fischel offers the most popular post-Manning explanation of ap-
praisal rights. Fischel views appraisal as an implied term of the corpo-
rate contract "that sets the minimum price at which the firm, or a part
of it, can be sold in situations where certain groups are more likely
to attempt to appropriate wealth from other groups than to maxi-
mize the value of the firm."24 Fischel gives two examples of instances
where wealth appropriation is more likely than wealth maximization:
(1) "when shareholders of one firm attempt to exploit the coordina-
tion problems of shareholders of another firm" by making a coercive,
two-tiered tender offer at blended price which may be lower than the
current market value of the latter firm's shares; 25 and (2) when a
majority shareholder attempts to "confiscate the pro rata share of the
minority in a freeze-out merger"—that is, where a majority shareholder
uses its control to approve a merger which provides minority share-
holders with less than the fair value of their shares. 26 Fischel suggests
that, by setting a minimum price which must be paid to objecting
shareholders in the second step of a two-tiered tender offer or in a
freeze-out merger, appraisal rights minimize the likelihood that two-
tiered tender offers and freeze-out mergers will be used to appropriate
shareholder wealth. He therefore concludes that the appraisal remedy
benefits all shareholders by causing shares to trade at higher prices ex
ante.°
21 Fischel, SUPTII note 12.
22
 Kanda & Levitiore, supra note 13.
23 GILSON, Supra 110IC 14.
24 Fischel, supra note 12, at 876.
23 Id. For instance, a bidder might offer S40 per share for 51% of the firm's stock in a partial
tender offer and announce an intention to acquire the remaining shares for $30 in second step
merger which will follow its acquisition of control; shareholders might accept the offer, which
has a blended value of slightly more than $35 per share, even if they think their shares are worth
$37.50, because they fear being forced to accept $30 per share in a second step merger if they
fail to tender.
26 Id. at 876-77.
27 See id. at 878-81.
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Fischel's theory overcomes Manning's principal concern regard-
ing the traditional theory of appraisal rights by providing an explana-
tion for why some types of "fundamental" corporate changes trigger
appraisal rights while others do not. In short, Fischel argues that
appraisal rights should only be triggered in cases where their applica-
tion will reduce the likelihood of value-decreasing transactions. This is
true when appraisal rights are applied to transactions such as coercive,
two-tiered tender offers and freeze-out mergers, because, without ap-
praisal rights, shareholders might be forced to sell their shares to a
bidder or controlling shareholder at too low a price. But it is not true
when appraisal rights are applied to actions of outsiders, such as a
presidential heart attack or labor strife, or to actions by managers in
circumstances where managers already have strong incentives to maxi-
mize firm value. This is because conferring appraisal rights on share-
holders in these instances will neither reduce the likelihood that ac-
tions by outsiders will harm the corporation nor improve the quality
of decisionmaking by already well-motivated managers.
But while Fischel's theory of appraisal rights at least roughly ex-
plains the pattern of appraisal statutes, the theory is far from perfect.
First, Fischel's theory fails to fully explain the basic triggering provi-
sions of appraisal statutes. 28
 As Fischel himself concedes," his theory
cannot explain why virtually all corporate statutes provide for appraisal
rights in connection with arms-length mergers, 3° a class of transactions
where managers do not face conflicts of interest that prevent them
from striking the best possible deal for shareholders. 31 Nor can Fis-
chel's theory explain the common application of appraisal rights to
charter amendments altering the corporation's purposes" or the fre-
quent denial of appraisal rights for transactions such as dissolutions
and reverse stock splits, even when those transactions are used by
majority shareholders to effect minority freeze-outs."
28
 Other commentators have also noted this problem. See, e.g„ Kanda & Levinore, supra note
13, at 435.
"See Fischel, supra note 12, at 884 n.36.
5° An arms-length merger is one where two unrelated firms merge.
31 This problem is also noted by Kanda & Le /more, supra note 13, at 435. For a discussion
of Gilson's solution to this problem with Fischel's theory, "see infra text accompanying note 89.
32
 The application of appraisal statutes to charter amendments is not unusual. See supra note
1. Under Fischel's theory, appraisal rights should only be triggered by charter amendments if the
application of appraisal rights could be expected to reduce the incidence of sub-optimal amend-
ments. But this result is unlikely since managers will ordinarily have strong incentives to endorse
only those charter amendments that maximize firm value. For a general discussion of the
constraints which operate on firm managers, see LARRY E. RiBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS
AssocIATIoNs 295-98 (3d ed. 1996).
]3 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 34.
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Second, Fischel's theory cannot explain the popularity of the
market out which, as previously noted, generally withdraws appraisal
rights when the objector's shares are publicly traded. 34 Fischel acknow-
ledges this problem in Part II of his article:
A far more persuasive criticism of the [market out] is that it
is inconsistent with the purpose of appraisal . . . . [For exam-
pled [w] ithdrawing the appraisal rights of the shareholders
of the [minority] bloc if their shares are publicly traded .. .
will not solve the problem of the majority being able to
appropriate wealth from the minority ex post . . . ."
But Fischel contends that the tension between his theory and the
market out is lessened, at least in Delaware, because the Delaware
statute restores appraisal rights where shareholders must exchange
publicly traded shares for cash or debt." This, he says, represents "a
recognition . . . that appraisal should be available when the danger
of appropriation is the greatest""—i.e., in cases where the minority
is completely frozen out of the firm, rather than provided with a
continuing equity interest. But Fischel's reliance on a "cash-out"
exception to reconcile his wealth appropriation theory of appraisal
with the market out is not persuasive for at least three reasons:
34 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
95 Fischel, supra note 12, at 885. Put another way, investors who hold publicly traded shares
are just as susceptible to wealth appropriations through two-tiered tender offers and freeze-out
mergers as are investors whose shares arc not publicly traded.
ss See id. The cash-out exception to the market out is set forth at title 8, section 262(b) (2)
of the Delaware Code, That section provides as follows:
Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this subsection, appraisal rights under this
section shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock of a constituent
corporation if the holders thereof are Icquircd by the terms of an agreement of
merger or consolidation pursuant to §§ 251, 252, 254, 257, 258, 263 and 264 of this
title to accept for such stock anything except:
a. Shares of stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger or
consolidation, or depository receipts in respect thereof;
b. Shares of stock of any other corporation, or depository receipts in respect
thereof, which shares of stock (or depository receipts in respect thereof) or deposi-
tory receipts at the effective date of the merger or consolidation will be either listed
on a national securities exchange or designated as a national market system security
on an interdealer quotation system by the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc. or held of record by inure than 2,000 holders;
c. Cash in lieu of fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described in
the foregoing subparagraphs a. and b. of this paragraph; or
d. Any combiiiation of the shares of stock, depository receipts and cash in lieu of
fractional shares or fractional depository receipts described in the foregoing sub-
paragraphs a., b. and c. of this paragraph.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (b)(2).
37 Id.
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(1) Fischel's interpretation of the purpose underlying Delaware's
cash-out exception may not be correct; 38
 (2) the cash-out exception
does not completely eliminate the dissonance between Fischel's
theory and the market out, since the exception fails to restore
appraisal rights where the consideration in a two-tiered tender offer
or freeze-out merger takes the form of shares in the surviving
corporation or other publicly traded shares; and (3) the cash-out
exception to the market out is rare outside of Delaware .s 9
Third, Fischel's theory of appraisal is inconsistent with the tradi-
tional ability of shareholders to pursue derivative suits and class actions
alleging breach of fiduciary duty in cases like freeze-out mergers, even
when appraisal rights are available. 40
 Shareholder suits in these circum-
stances serve precisely the same function that Fischel assigns to ap-
praisal rights: by assessing the adequacy of the consideration paid to
the shareholders in the challenged transaction, they set a minimum
price at which the firm, or a part thereof, can be sold. They therefore
decrease the likelihood of value-decreasing transactions initiated by
bidders and controlling shareholders. In addition, shareholder deriva-
tive suits and class actions arguably perform this function more effec-
tively than do appraisal rights. This is because appraisal statutes typi-
cally create significant obstacles to shareholder recovery. Shareholders
must properly perfect their appraisal rights by giving the corporation
prior notice of their intent to seek appraisal, by failing to vote in favor
of the triggering transaction, and by filing the appraisal action in a
timely fashion:4 ' individual shareholders must file their own suits and
bear their own litigation expenses; 12
 and shareholders lose their voting
and dividend rights during the pendency of the proceeding." These
38 See infra Part 11.B.7 (arguing that cash.out exception to the market out was intended to
restrict the tights of minority shareholders to challenge cash-out mergers, not to expand them).
39 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 30.
4° See LAI-nu, supra note 4, at 599; see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 21. The Delaware
Supreme Court appeared to depart from the traditional rule in Weinberger u UOR Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1985), where the court held that "a plaintiff's monetary remedy [in a cash-out merger]
ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding heivin established."
457 A.2d at 714 (emphasis added). But the court greatly limited the reach of this aspect of its
Weinberger decision in Rabhin v. P.A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985), where the
court reversed the dismissal of a shareholder class action challenging the fairness of a merger
between a corporation and its majority shareholder.
41 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 40 (summarizing steps that ditsenting shareholders must
take in most states in order to perfect appraisal rights).
42 See id. at 41 (noting that "[n]c) provision is made for a class action or other means that
would permit shareholders in a common situation to share an attorney and other expenses of
litigation easily").
43 Set id. (noting that lalppraisal litigation can drag on for a considerable time, and some
September 1998]	 THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL	 1129
obstacles ensure that the minimum price set for a firm's shares in an
appraisal proceeding will only be paid to a relatively small subset of
the firm's shareholders. Bidders and controlling shareholders may
therefore expect to succeed in appropriating the wealth of a substantial
percentage of the firm's stockholders, even in cases where appraisal
rights are available. 14 By contrast, no such bars to shareholder recovery
exist in shareholder derivative suits and class actions, so bidders and
controlling shareholders are more likely to be forced to compensate
all shareholders who are harmed by their actions.
Finally, Fischel's wealth appropriation theory fails to adequately
explain the distinctive form of the appraisal remedy—a court-ordered
sale of the dissenter's shares to the corporation rather than an award
of damages equal to the difference between the "fair value" of the
shares and the amount offered in the challenged transaction. A "dam-
ages" remedy would serve the goal of setting a "minimum price at
which a firm, or a part of it, can be sold" 45 equally as well as the
traditional "buy-out" remedy. In addition, it offers one important ad-
vantage: because a damages remedy requires corporations to raise less
cash than a buy-out remedy, it entails a smaller risk that the transaction
costs of obtaining the necessary cash will derail otherwise profitable
corporate transactions, 46
states, including Delaware, make no provision for minority shareholders to be paid until the
litigation is over").
44 Fischel recognizes this problem with his theory. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 901. The
practical difficulties of asserting appraisal rights (and, therefore, appraisal's inability to function
as an effective check on majotity misconduct) have been frequently noted by commentators. See,
e.g., Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297, 304-07 (1974); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 VALE L.J. 698, 731 n.98 (1982); Melvin Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders
and Management in Modern Corporate Decision Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1969); Manning,
supra note 5, at 230-31; James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal
Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (1964); see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra
note 1, pt. VII, ch. 4, Reporter's Note 3 to Introductory Note, at 296. Cf. Thompson, supra note
3, at 28 (noting that "Mlle transformation of appraisal into a remedy for self-dealing does not
easily fit with existing appraisal statutes").
45 Fische], supra note 12, at 876.
46 Cf. Manning, supra note 5, at 234-35 (noting that "[Oven a relatively modest number of
shareholders claiming the appraisal remedy may constitute a severe economic threat to the
corporate enterprise," since the "demand for a cash pay-out to shareholders often comes at a
time when the enterprise is in I iced of every liquid dollar it can put its hands on;" and that "[elven
though the company may be economically very strong, it may be unable to go ahead with the
[appraisal-triggering transaction] at all if the aggregated claim of dissenting shareholders under
the appraisal statute comes to a high figure").
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B. Kanda and Levmore's Inframarginality, Reckoning and Discovery
Theories
Although Kanda and Levmore do not extensively explore the
point, they recognize the lack of explanatory power of Fischel's theory
of appraisal rights. 17
 Accordingly, they offer three different theories of
appraisal which they term "inframarginality," "reckoning" and "discov-
ery," respectively. In Kanda and Levmore's view, one or more of these
theories explains the various appraisal statutes in effect throughout the
United States.
1. Inframarginality
"Inframarginality" refers to the idea that all shareholders may not
"appreciate" their shares identically—i.e., some shareholders may value
their shares in excess of the marginal (or market) price." As a result,
the marginal (or market) price of shares may understate the average
value of shares. Kanda and Levmore suggest that some appraisal stat-
utes may be designed to protect such inframarginal values since they
give shareholders a remedy in cases where inframarginal values may
be lost.
Kanda and Levmore offer Delaware General Corporation Law
§ 262 as their principal example of an inframarginality statute." Dela-
ware's version of the market out, they say, effectively restricts appraisal
to transactions that are most likely to result in a net decrease in in-
framarginal values: (1) transactions where shareholders give up thinly
traded stock and receive either widely traded securities or cash; and
(2) transactions where widely traded stock is exchanged for cash." In
Kanda and Levmore's view, these transactions are most likely to result
in a net loss of inframarginal values because inframarginal values are
more likely to be present in thinly traded shares than in widely traded
ones and should be completely absent in the case of cash.5 '
Like Fischel's theory, Kanda and Levmore's inframarginality the-
ory of appraisal suffers from several serious flaws. First, the assertion
that some shareholders value their shares more highly than others (i.e.,
that inframarginal values exist) is doubtful, particularly for widely
traded shares. As Easterbrook and Fischel explain, it is unlikely that
47 See Kanda & Levntore, supra note 13, at 435.
48 Id. at 437-38.
49
 See id. at 446-51.
5° See id. at 447.
51 See id. at 439-40.
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different shareholders will place different values on the same invest-
ment because Iiinvestors can make mutually beneficial trades until
those holding any given firm's stock have reasonably homogeneous
expectations about its performance."52
Second, even assuming that some shareholders value their shares
more highly than the market price, Kanda and Levmore's theory fails
to fully explain the triggering provisions of even those statutes that they
identify as inframarginality statutes. For instance, Delaware's appraisal
statute permits appraisal rights to be asserted where shareholders sur-
render widely traded shares and receive thinly traded ones and where
shareholders trade thinly traded stock for thinly traded stock. 53 These
transactions, however, pose little risk that inframarginal values will be
lost.54
Third, Kanda and Levmore's inframarginality theory conflicts with
the valuation principles traditionally applied in appraisal proceedings.
To protect inframarginal values, the appraiser must be allowed to
award some premium over the marginal (or market) value of the dis-
senter's shares. 55 But, as the commentators note, cases that award
52 Easter!), ook & Fischcl, supra note 44, at 726-27.
55 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b).
54
 Kanda and Levniorc's theory is also arguably inconsistent with Delaware's treatment of
dissolutions and sales of substantially all the firm's assets: both dissolutions and asset sales can
arguably result in the loss of infratnat ginal values, if, for instance, shares are exchanged for cash,
but appraisal rights arc denied. But cj: DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 8, § 262(c) (providing that "[a]ny
corporation may provide in its certificate of incorporation that appraisal rights . . . shall be
available for the shares . . . of its stock as a result of . . . the sale of all or substantially all of the
assets of the col poration"). Kanda and Levmor e offer somewhat unsatisfactory explanations for
these anomalies in the Delaware statute. With respect to transactions where publicly traded shares
are exchanged for thinly traded ones, Kanda and Levntore say "[such transactions] must be so
rar c that the statute can be expected either to ignore [them] or to be suspicious enough to grant
appraisal." Kanda & Levniore, supra note 13, at 448. Clearly the drafters of the Delaware statute
did trot ignore these transactions, as the exception is explicit; why the drafters might be suspicious
of these transactions (apart from their relative rarity) is not explained. With respect to transac-
tions where thinly traded stock is exchanged for thinly traded stock, Kanda and Levinore write
as follows: "appraisal statutes may well reflect a variety of goals even while one goal alone makes
them most comprehensible." Id. at 451. This explanation would be more convincing if Kanda
and Levmor e identified other provisions of the Delaware statute which furthered goals other than
inframarginality.
55 See Kauda & Levniore, supra note 13, at 451. A pure infraimuginality statute would
authorize the appraiser to measure each dissenter's idiosyncratic estimation of a share's value.
See id. But Kanda and Levntore contend that inframarginality statutes are unlikely to include such
broad authorizations "because no objective evidence exists regarding an individual's subjective
valuation." Id. at 439. The authors then attempt to rescue their intiamarginality theory by arguing
that "shareholders, legislators, and judges simply could understand that an incantation which
yielded an appraised value somewhat greater than the marginal market value would do the job"
of protecting infratnarginal values, albeit "in only an inexact way." Id. Thus, Kanda and Levmore
conclude, "some power to give more than marginal value would be reassuring." Id. at 451.
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dissenting shareholders more than the pre-transaction market value
for their shares are rare. 56 This traditional view is hardly surprising
since most states (including Delaware) define fair value in an appraisal
proceeding as the value of the shares on the day before the transac-
tion exclusive of any appreciation or depreciation attributable to the
merger."
Finally, like Fischel's theory, Kanda and Levmore's inframarginal-
ity theory fails to adequately explain the distinctive form of the ap-
praisal remedy. As noted above, the traditional remedy in an appraisal
proceeding is a court-ordered buy-out of the dissenter's shares, rather
than an award of damages equal to the difference between the fair
value of the shares and the consideration offered in the challenged
transaction. A damages remedy would protect inframarginal values just
as well 'as a buy-out remedy, but, for the reasons noted earlier,58 would
expose corporations to a diminished risk of large cash drains that could
impede otherwise value-increasing transactions.
2. Reckoning
The second goal that Kanda and Levrnore suggest for appraisal
statutes is "reckoning." Kanda and Levmore begin their explanation of
reckoning by noting that shareholders must monitor corporations in
order to evaluate managerial performance. Such monitoring, they
58 See, e.g., Brudney & Chit elstein, supra note 44, at 307 11.28 (noting that a portion of the
gain attributable to the merger has never been included in valuation in appraisal proceedings");
Manning, supra note 5, at 232 (noting that, at least where widely traded shares are concerned,
"courts have virtually refused to go beyond an inquiry as to the market price on the date
determined to be relevant"); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 20 & 11.86, 35-36 & n.149 (citing
REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01 comment (1985) for the proposition that a majority of states
adhere to the goal of preserving minority shareholders prior rights as shareholders).
57 Since the early 1980s, some states, including Delaware, have modified their appraisal
procedures to allow appraisers to award a premium over the pre-merger value of the dissenter's
shares. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (authorizing courts to consider
"elements of future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible
of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation"). This change is
consistent with the view of Delaware General Corporation Law section 262 as an inframarginality
statute. However, at least two problems remain: first, the extent to which Delaware law actually
authorizes the award of a premium over the pre-merger value of shares remains unclear, see Cede
Co Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); and, second, because the current version of
the Delaware appraisal statute pre-dates the change in valuation rules by 15 years, it is difficult
to conclude, as Kanda and Levmore do, that the provisions of the Delaware statute are in any
way motivated by a desire to protect infrantarginal shareholders. Cf. William J. Carney, Funda-
mental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 A.M. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 69, 116-17 (arguing that appraisal is an inadequate check on conduct of controlling sharehold-
ers because appraisal fails to protect inframarginal values).
58 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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contend, becomes difficult when fundamental change occurs in the
middle of an accounting period because he entity that emerges
after the change may be different enough from that managed before
the change that much information about the managers will be lost if
the two experiences are evaluated as one."69 Appraisal, in their view,
provides a potential solution to this monitoring problem: "since ap-
praisal of some shares requires appraisal of the enterprise's value as a
whole,"6° "appraisal at the time of the change . . . may serve as a point
of 'reckoning;' prior performance is reckoned and future perform-
ance can be judged from the benchmark determined at appraisal." 6 '
Kanda and Levmore offer the Michigan and New Jersey appraisal
statutes as their principal examples of reckoning statutes. 62 Both stat-
utes allow shareholders of a target corporation in an acquisition to
enjoy appraisal rights unless the shares they surrender are widely
traded, or they receive either widely traded shares or cash .° Kanda and
Levmore argue that this pattern of appraisal rights is entirely consistent
with a reckoning goal. An acquisition, they suggest, is an appropriate
point to reckon the performance of target managers since the acqui-
sition may so change the target firm that it will be difficult to evaluate
prior and future performance without the benchmark established
through an appraisal proceeding. But they reason that appraisal rights
are unnecessary when target shareholders either surrender widely
traded shares or receive widely traded shares or cash because the
benchmark for evaluating prior and future performance can be easily
established from the market value of the shares surrendered or the
consideration received. 64
But while the reckoning theory of appraisal does a good job
explaining some basic features of the Michigan and New Jersey ap-
praisal statutes, the theory is undermined by its inconsistency with
many of the procedural aspects of those statutes. The reckoning the-
ory, as explicated by Kanda and Levmore, suggests that appraisal is
designed to benefit shareholders as a group by facilitating investor
monitoring of managerial performance. Accordingly, one would ex-
66 Kanda & Levmore, SUPTa note 13, at 441.
(4 Id. at 442.
61 Id. at 441.
62 See id. at 442-43 (Michigan), 452-55 (New Jersey).
63 See id. at 442 (Michigan), 453 (New jet scy). The market out under the Delaware statute
only applies in cases where dissenting shareholders give up widely traded shares; unlike the New
Jersey and Michigan statutes under consideration here, it would not apply when thinly traded
shares are exchanged for cash or widely traded shares.
64 See Kanda & ',cynical:, supra note 12, at 442 (Michigan), 453 (New jersey).
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pect shareholders as a group to be required to bear the costs of
prosecuting appraisal actions and, perhaps, to have the power to block
or terminate appraisal actions if they determined that the costs to the
firm of a reckoning exceeded the benefits. Instead, however, the Michi-
gan and New Jersey statutes, like appraisal statutes generally, vest all
decisionmaking authority vis-a-vis the appraisal proceeding in the dis-
senters and generally require dissenters to bear their own expenses. 65
This leads to a result which is difficult to reconcile with Kanda and
Levmore's theory: reckonings of firm value may be pursued when they
impose net costs on shareholders and may be foregone when they offer
net benefits.66
In addition, the reckoning theory cannot explain the more com-
mon form of appraisal statute which includes a market out that applies
when shareholders surrender widely traded shares, but not when they
simply receive them. These statutes would provide for appraisal in
many instances when a reckoning through appraisal was unnecessary—
that is, when a benchmark for evaluating prior and future performance
could be easily established from the market value of the consideration
received.
Finally, like the other theories considered so far, the reckoning
theory of appraisal cannot explain why the remedy in appraisal takes
the form of a transition-threatening buy-out, rather than a damages
award.°
3. Discovery
The third goal that Kanda and Levmore suggest for appraisal
is discovery. Kanda and Levmore assert that, while managerial and
shareholder interests are never perfectly aligned, mergers and other
fundamental changes may magnify the opportunities for managerial
misbehavior, In particular, they contend that, "Nil the context of
fundamental corporate changes, which often trigger the appraisal rem-
edy,'" managers may be tempted to sell corporate secrets to outsiders
65
 Mimi. STAT. ANN. § 450.1774 (Callaghan 1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-10 (West 1997).
66
 Kanda and Lei/more note the latter problem—that appraisal procedures might lead reck-
onings to be foregone when they offer net benefits to shareholders. But they conclude, "it may
be that as an empirical matter the statutes' disinclination to force appraisal is no obstacle to the
reckoning theme; there may always be at least one feisty or selfless shareholder who does the
job." Kanda & Lcvmorc, supra note 13, at 455. However, Kanda and Levmore do not address the
possibility that appraisal procedures will lead to the overuse of the appraisal remedy.
67 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68 See Kanda & Levmorc, supra note 13, at 443.
69 Id. at 456.
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"in return for attractive employment contracts or other considera-
tion"7° instead of "bargain [ing] for bigger stakes on behalf of all share-
holders."71 Appraisal, they argue, may operate as a check on such
misbehavior:
While the law probably should not aim to discover and reveal
the secrets [managers] may harbor, because often the revela-
tion will injure all shareholders and ultimately the economy
as a whole, it may hope, through threat of appraisal, to force
from management and the acquirer a large enough premium
over market price to dissuade potential dissenters, discourage
inefficient transactions, and roughly compensate sharehold-
ers for the secrets that are theirs. 72
Kanda and Levmore offer the New York appraisal statute as their
principal example of a discovery statute. Under New York law, "ap-
praisal is available, with no market exception, to the target's shareholders
in a merger, as well as in [most] ... sale[s] of assets . . . ," and is
available "to the shareholders of a corporation that undergoes a char-
ter amendment seriously affecting shareholder rights."3 This broad
trigger, Kanda and Levmore assert, ensures that appraisal will be avail-
able to shareholders whenever "there is reason to worry both that
managers are not serving shareholders well as bargaining agents and
that managers have secrets about future opportunities or hidden val-
ues." But, Kanda and Levmore note, New York law withdraws ap-
praisal rights when the assets of targets are sold for cash and the sales
are followed by liquidations. This, they argue, is consistent with their
theory because a "[cash sale followed by a liquidation] is less prone to
managerial exploitation since it involves dispersing the target's assets
and terminating the employment of the target's management." In
Kanda and Levinore's view, when target management retire rather than
continue in the surviving business, there is little reason to doubt "their
reliability as bargaining agents for the target against the acquirer." 76
7° Id.
71 Id. at 443.
72 1d. at 457.
75 Kanda & Lc-vitiate, supra note 13, at 460-61 (emphasis in original). Kanda and Levmore
argue that a market out should not be expected in a discovery statute like New York's because,
when an appraisal statute is based on the potential misuse of corporate secrets, "marketability is
hardly relevant since the market is unaware of these secrets and therefore °frets little help." Id.
at 459-60.
74 Id. at 460.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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Kanda and Levmore's discovery theory of appraisal suffers from
two principal flaws. First, the discovery theory of appraisal lacks ex-
planatory power, even when applied to the triggering provision of the
New York appraisal statute. As noted, the New York statute withdraws
appraisal rights from target shareholders when assets are sold for cash
and the sale is followed by a liquidation. Kanda and Levmore base their
defense of this withdrawal of appraisal rights on two premises: first,
that a transaction is more prone to exploitation if managers do not
retire, presumably because side payments for corporate secrets can be
more easily concealed in such cases; and second, that managers of
firms that liquidate are more likely to retire than managers of ones
that do not." As Kanda and Levmore themselves acknowledge, this
second premise (for which Kanda and Levmore offer no evidentiary
support) is highly suspect. 78 In other words, asset sales followed by
liquidations seem at least as susceptible to managerial exploitation as
asset sales not followed by liquidations. In addition, the New York
statute provides for appraisal rights in cases of charter amendments
that seriously affect shareholder rights. 79
 This, too, is arguably incon-
sistent with a discovery goal for appraisal because managers cannot
easily use charter amendments, alone, as vehicles for converting cor-
porate secrets into personal wealth. 8°
Indeed, even if the triggers of the New York statute more closely
matched Kanda and Levmore's theory, a discovery goal for appraisal
would still be doubtful. For appraisal statutes to serve a discovery goal,
they must effectively deter the kind of managerial misconduct that is
the focus of Kanda and Levmore's analysis—i.e., the sale of corporate
secrets to outsiders in exchange for attractive employment contracts
or other consideration. This, however, is unlikely. As noted above,
appraisal statutes typically create significant obstacles to shareholder
recovery: shareholders must properly perfect their appraisal rights by
giving the corporation prior notice of their intent to seek appraisal, by
failing to vote in favor of the triggering transaction and by filing the
appraisal action in a timely fashion; individual shareholders must file
their own suits and bear their own litigation expenses; and sharehold-
ers lose their voting and dividend rights during the pendency of the
77 See id.
7s
	 Kanda & Levmore, supra note 13, at 460 (noting that the "correlation between the
firm's liquidation and its managers' retireznent" may not be strong).
"See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 806(d) (6) (Consul. 1997).
8°Kanda and Levinore assert that New York's appraisal trigger for charter amendments is
consistent with their discovery theory, but fail to explain the point. See Kanda Levinore, supra
note 13, at 461.
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proceeding.8 I These obstacles ensure that only a relatively small subset
of the firm's shareholders will be able to obtain compensation for the
value of the corporate secrets sold by the firm's managers. Accordingly,
appraisal rights, alone, are unlikely to prevent managers from diverting
most of the value of corporate secrets to themselves. 82
As Kanda and Levmore acknowledge, none of the three theories
they offer can, by itself, explain the provisions of even a single appraisal
statute." In addition, each of their theories conflicts with at least one
of the basic provisions of the typical appraisal statute: inframarginality
is inconsistent with valuation principles that focus on pre-transaction
market value; reckoning is inconsistent with basic procedural rules that
give dissenters control over, and force dissenters to bear the costs of,
appraisal proceedings; and the discovery goal conflicts with the market
out. Accordingly, the likelihood that any of these concerns played a
large role in motivating drafters of appraisal statutes is small.
C. Gilson's Managerial Incentives Theory
Gilson attempts to explain appraisal by focusing on the charac-
teristics of the transactions that typically trigger the appraisal remedy.
In his view, appraisal triggering transactions generally share two char-
acteristics: (1) the ability, "by altering the asset makeup or leverage of
the company, or the businesses in which the company is engaged, to
alter the company's beta in a fashion that the shareholders could not
have anticipated;"" and (2) the presence of "final period" problems
that render market constraints on managerial self-dealing inopera-
tive. 85 Gilson infers from these characteristics that the purpose of ap-
81 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
82 Kanda and Levmore suggest that appraisal might nonetheless deter managerial misconduct
because "appraisal itself will threaten to drain the corporation's funds and therefore may deter
misbehavior by managers whose plans require the presence of these funds." Kanda & Levinore,
supra note 13, at 444. Accordingly, unlike the other theories considered so far, Kanda and
Levmore's discovery theory arguably explains why the appraisal remedy takes the form of a
buy-out rather than a damages award: a bity-out maximizes the cash drain from appraisal and
therefore increases the remedy's deterrent effect. But since transactions where the cash drain
from appraisal is large'enough to derail the entire transaction are the exception rather than the
rule, appraisal rights, by themselves, still seem unlikely to prevent managers from diverting the
value of corporate secrets to themselves.
" See id. at 463.
84 GILSON & BIACE, supra note 14, at 718. "Beta" measures the sensitivity of the firm's returns
to market risk (i.e., the extent to which returns to the firm's shareholders fluctuate with move-
ments in the market as a whole). See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 16, at 160-62. So a change
in a company's beta Means a change in the market risk associated with an investnient in that
firm. See supra note 16.
85 Gilson offers thp following explanation of the final period problem: "(slimply put, in a
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praisal is to "create a substantial ex ante incentive for management to
avoid uncompensated alterations in beta" in circumstances where mar-
ket constraints on managerial misconduct may not function 8 6
 This
protection, Gilson argues, is important because shareholders are not
paid to take the risk of unanticipated alterations in beta and that risk
cannot be fully diversified away.
Gilson's theory of appraisal more effectively explains the trigger-
ing provisions of the typical appraisal statute than competing theories.
Gilson's theory explains why appraisal rights are triggered by funda-
mental changes brought on by managers but not by fundamental
changes brought on by outsiders (the role of appraisal rights is to
provide managers with ex ante incentives to avoid misconduct, not to
insulate shareholders from risks they have been paid to take or can
entirely diversify away) ;87
 it explains why shareholders of firms that sell
substantially all their assets ordinarily get appraisal rights, while share-
holders of firms that purchase those assets do not (managers of selling
firms are in their final period, where market constraints on behavior
may not function, while managers of purchasing firms are not); 88 and,
unlike Fischel's theory,89
 it explains why appraisal rights might be made
situation where parties expect to have repeated transactions, the recognition that a party who
cheats in one transaction will be penalized by the other party in subsequent transactions reduces
the incentive to cheat. However, when the transaction is the last (or only) in a series—that is the
final period—the incentive to cheat reappears because, by definition, the penalty for doing so
has disappeared," Grisoiv, supra note 14, at 720. Translated into the corporate context, managers
are ordinarily constrained to act in the interests of shareholders because a failure to do so will
trigger post-transaction penalties in product markets, capital markets, the market for managers
and the market for corporate control. But when managers are in their final period, post-transac-
tion market penalties are no longer of concern. So managers in their final period are more likely
to ignore shareholder interests.
66 Id. at 720.
67 See id at 718.
88 See id, at 720-21 ("In the context of an acquisition nothing stops target management from
selling out the shareholders in return for side payments from the acquiring company because
target management, by definition, will no longer be subject to the constraints of the product,
capital and control markets after the acquisition. Perhaps more importantly, if the remaining
professional careers of target management are getting short, the size of the side payment may
more than compensate them for any ex past penalty imposed by the market for managers.") This
analysis also explains provisions like Delaware General Corporation Law section 251(f), which
generally deny appraisal rights to shareholders of the firm that survives a merger if those
shareholders end up owning at least 5/6 of the combined firm. Cf. Thompson, supra note 3, at
10 (noting most states now have provisions similar to Delaware General Corporation Law section
251(1)). This allocation of ownership interests suggests that the surviving firm is the acquiror
and, therefore, that the managers of the surviving firm are not in their final period. Accordingly,
surviving firm shareholders have no need for appraisal rights.
89 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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available even in connection with arms-length transactions (managers
of one or both firms may be in their final period).
Gilson's managerial incentives theory, however, shares many of the
same problems that plague competing theories of appraisal. First, like
Fischel's theory and Kanda and Levmore's discovery analysis, Gilson's
theory of appraisal rights cannot account for the popularity of the
market out. Under the typical market out, appraisal rights are with-
drawn from a firm's shareholders when their shares are publicly
traded. This means that shareholders of a publicly held firm that sells
substantially all its assets to another firm (or that merges with another
firm) generally would be denied appraisal even though the transaction
has the hallmarks of an appraisal-triggering event—the ability to alter
the company's beta in a fashion that the shareholders may not have
anticipated and the presence of final period problems that render
market constraints on managerial conduct largely inoperative. 90
Second, like Fischel's theory and Kanda and Levmore's discovery
analysis, Gilson's theory of appraisal is inconsistent with procedural
limitations on the appraisal remedy. As noted earlier, appraisal statutes
typically create significant obstacles to shareholder recovery so that
only a small number of shareholders can be expected to successfully
assert appraisal rights.9 ' Accordingly, since the threat of appraisal is
small, the remedy's capacity to deter managerial misconduct is likewise
small.
Third, like all the theories considered thus far (other than Kanda
and Levmore's discovery theory), Gilson's theory cannot explain why
the appraisal remedy takes the form of a buy-out, rather than a dam-
ages award. A damages remedy would serve the goal of "creat[ing] a
substantial ex ante incentive for management to avoid uncompensated
alterations in beta" 92 equally as well as the traditional buy-out remedy,
but, as has been noted previously,93 would do so without exposing
corporations to an increased risk of large cash drains that could im-
pede otherwise value-increasing transactions.
"The market out is not the only aspect of the triggering provisions of the typical appraisal
statute that Gilson's theory fails to explain. In addition, Gilson's theory cannot explain why
appraisal statutes are often triggered by charter amendments that alter the purpose for which a
corporation is organized: although such charter amendments clearly pose a risk of altering the
beta of a firm's shales (if, for instance, they authorize the firm to engage in a very different type
of business from that authorized by the corporation's original charter), those amendments do
not appear to involve filial period problems.
°I See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
92 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 14, at 720.
93 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Gilson's theory faces one problem not shared by other
theories of appraisal considered above: although Gilson correctly notes
that the appraisal remedy is limited to transactions that pose a risk of
substantially altering beta, 94
 he fails to provide a satisfactory theoretical
explanation for that limitation. Other final period transactions, apart
from the beta-altering transactions that trigger appraisal, can benefit
managers at the expense of shareholders. For instance, managers can
simply dissolve the firm and distribute an excessive portion of the assets
to themselves. Why provide shareholders with an appraisal remedy to
check one type of final period problem but not the other?
H. THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL RECONSIDERED
A. A Preference Reconciliation Theory of Appraisal
The discussion in Part I leads directly to the basic question that is
the focus of the remainder of this article: if appraisal statutes are not
about solving the problems identified by Fischel, Kanda and Levmore,
and Gilson, what are they about? The answer offered here focuses on
the capacity of appraisal rights to reconcile differing shareholder pref-
erences with respect to transactions that alter the risk of the firm's
shares.95
 As the discussion below explains, when shareholders lack ef-
fective access to capital markets, risk-altering transactions (particularly
those which alter the firm's market risk 95) can make some shareholders
better off while leaving others worse off. 97
 Appraisal rights require the
corporation to compensate shareholders who may be harmed by such
transactions and place the net costs of providing that compensation
on shareholders who otherwise gain. As a result, shareholders who
otherwise gain from appraisal-triggering transactions will only vote in
favor of those transactions if their gains more than offset the net costs
of compensating objectors. Appraisal rights therefore decrease the
94 See infra Part II.B.1.
95 For a definition of "risk," see supra note 16.
99 For a definition of "market risk," see supra note 16.
97 As was explained earlier, see supra note 18, transactions that alter a firm's unique risk will
not ordinarily have any impact on investors because investors can eliminate the unique risk
associated with a particular security by holding a diversified portfolio of investments. See BREALEY
& MYERS, supra note 16, at 160. So most investors care only about transactions which alter the
firm's market risk (i.e., the firm's sensitivity to movements in the market as a whole). But some
investors are precluded from fully diversifying their investment portfolios because they are
required by practical or legal considerations to invest a substantial portion of their wealth in a
small number of companies. These investors will be affected by changes in unique risk, as well
as by changes in market risk. For purposes of the analysis that follows, a "lisk.altering" transaction
is one that alters the type of risk (market risk and/or intim= risk) that affects the firm's investors.
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probability of risk-altering transactions that result in net losses to share-
holders, causing all shares to trade at higher prices ex ante.98
1. The Impact of Appraisal on Risk-Altering Transactions
To see how appraisal rights decrease the probability of risk-altering
transactions that result in net losses to shareholders, consider first a
world where shareholders who lack effective access to capital markets
are denied appraisal rights. In that world, the value of shares held by
particular investors, following a risk-altering transaction, will depend
on the investor's personal taste for risk. Assume, for instance, that a
transaction increases both the risk of a firm's shares and the firm's
expected returns. Relatively less risk-averse shareholders may be made
better off by that transaction since those shareholders require relatively
modest increases in the firm's expected returns to compensate for
increased risk. In other words, these shareholders may prefer the new
combination of risk and return to the old. At the same time, relatively
more risk-averse shareholders, who require greater compensation for
increased risk, may be made worse off by the transaction. If, however,
these relatively more risk-averse shareholders do not own a majority of
the firm's shares, they will be unable to prevent the risk-increasing
transaction from taking place. Accordingly, the transaction may be
approved, even though some shareholders are made worse off and the
aggregate losses to shareholders exceed the gains.
The point can be illustrated with an example. Firm A is consider-
ing undertaking a risk-increasing transaction. Assume Firm A has two
groups of shareholders: Group' 1 consists of relatively less risk-averse
shareholders who own 51 of the firm's 100 outstanding shares and
believe that the risk-increasing transaction will increase the value of
their shares from $100 per share to $105 per share; Group 2 consists
of relatively more risk-averse shareholders who own the remaining 49
shares of the firm's stock and believe that the risk-increasing transac-
tion will decrease the value of their shares from $100 per share to $90
per share. Assume further that the shareholders are precluded from
selling their shares in secondary markets, either because resales are
legally restricted or because the transaction costs of accessing secon-
dary markets are prohibitive. In addition, assume that the corporation
is unwilling to repurchase the 49 shares held by the members of Group
"The preference reconciliation theory explains why appraisal might ordinarily be in the
interests of shareholders as a group; the theory does not, however, support the proposition that
appraisal rights should be mandatory for all firms.
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2 at a price greater than $90 per share because the transaction costs
of issuing new shares to obtain the necessary cash would make such a
purchase unprofitable for the firm (i.e., the firm would have to issue
more than 49 new shares in order to obtain the cash necessary to
repurchase the 49 old shares at a price greater than $90 per share). In
these circumstances, Group 1 shareholders will favor the risk-increas-
ing transaction, while Group 2 shareholders will oppose it. But since
Group 1's shareholders own a majority of the firm's stock, the transac-
tion may well be approved even though Group 2 shareholders are
made worse off and the aggregate losses to shareholders from the
risk-altering transaction exceed the gains."
But in a world with appraisal rights for risk-altering transactions,
the risk of this result is greatly reduced. Appraisal rights require the
corporation to purchase the shares of investors who object to the
transaction for a judicially determined "fair value," which corporation
statutes generally define to mean the value of the shares before the an-
nouncement of the transaction from which the shareholders dissent
(i.e., the pre-transaction value). By requiring the corporation to buy
back shares of objectors for their pre-transaction value, appraisal
rights, in effect, force the corporation to compensate objectors for
their losses. The net cost to the corporation of providing this compen-
sation is equal to the excess of: (a) the present value of the claims the
firm must issue to obtain the necessary cash to buy back the objectors'
shares; over (b) the present value of the shares the objectors surrender.
This net cost necessarily falls on the shareholders who elect not to
exercise appraisal rights—i.e., those shareholders who will keep their
shares because they expect to gain from the risk-altering transaction.
Appraisal rights therefore ensure that those who expect to gain from
risk-altering transactions (or their representatives) will only vote in
favor of such transactions when their gains are sufficient to cover the
net costs of compensating the losers.'"
" Group 2 shareholders could, of course, try to convince Group 1 shareholders to forego
the risk-increasing transaction, which would provide $255 of gains to the Group 1 shareholders
(51 shares times gain of $5 per share), by offering Group 1 shareholders a side payment greater
than $255. But the collective action problems of organizing such an offer could cause the total
cost to Group 1 shareholders to exceed the $490 loss that would be avoided (49 times the potential
loss of $10 per share if the transaction is consummated). So the possibility of bargaining among
groups of shareholders does not eliminate the possibility of risk-altering transactions where losses
exceed gains.
I" Shareholders who lack effective access to securities markets could behave strategically with
respect to appraisal rights. For example, a shareholder who might be harmed by a risk-altering
transaction if he had to retain his shares might nonetheless vote in favor of the transaction so as
to increase the likelihood of the appraisal-triggering transaction and the corresponding oppor-
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These effects of appraisal rights can be illustrated by returning to
the example considered above. In a world where shareholders who lack
effective access to securities markets are provided with appraisal rights,
Group 2 shareholders can be expected to exercise those rights and
demand payment equal to the pre-transaction value of their shares—
$100 per share. If the least expensive way for Firm A to obtain the
necessary cash to repurchase the objectors' 49 shares is to issue new
shares, the firm will have to issue enough shares to raise a net amount
of $4900 (49 shares times $100 per share). Assuming that new investors
attach the same value to the firm as the Group 1 investors (100 times
$105 or $10,500) and that the transaction costs of issuance amount to
20% of the gross proceeds of the offering, this means that the firm
must sell 71.39 new shares to obtain the $4900 necessary to compensate
objectors. [71.39 shares will give the new shareholders 58.33% of the
firm (71.39/122.39). The new shareholders will be willing to pay
$6125, or $85.79 per share, for this stake (58.33% of $10,500), and the
firm will net $4900 (80% of $6125) from the offering after expenses.] 1°t
The cost to the corporation of compensating objectors in this
fashion is equal to the excess of: (1) the value of the new claims issued
($6125); over (2) the present value of the objectors' shares following
the risk-altering transaction (49 shares times $105 per share or $5145);
or $980. This $980 cost to the corporation translates into a $980
expense for the Group 1 shareholders: if the Group 1 shareholders
wish to retain a 51% stake in the firm (and therefore avoid the dilution
in the value of their investment that would otherwise result from
the new stock issuance), they must purchase 11.42 of the 71.39 newly
tunity to liquidate his investment. As a result of this strategic behavior ., the appraisal-triggering
transaction might be approved by the firm's shareholders even though the losses to shareholders
exceed the gains. But appraisal statutes typically block such strategic voting behavior by requiring
shareholders who seek appraisal rights to either vote against the triggering transaction or abstain
from voting. (Since transactions that trigger appraisal typically require a vote of a majority of all
the outstanding shares, an abstention is the functional equivalent of a "no" vote,)
I°IThese amounts are computed in the following fashion. The first step is to compute the
percentage of the firm that must be sold to new investors to net $4900, assuming that new
investors attach a $10,500 value to the firm. That percentage is computed by solving the following
equation: X* (S10,500) [the gross proceeds raised by the offering] .2 * X* ($10,500) [the costs
of the offering] == $4900. Solving for Xyiclds a value .5833 or 58.33%. This mewls that, following
the offering, the 51 shares held by the Group 1 shareholders must represent 41.67% of the total
outstanding [100% -58.33%], which means that: (1) the total number of shares outstanding after
the offering is 122.39 [.4167 times 122.39 equals 51]; (2) 71.39 new shares have been issued
[122.39 minus the 51 retained by the Group 1 shareholders]; (3) the price per slime of the newly
issued shares is $85.79 [S10,500 divided by 122.39 shares]; (4) the gross proceeds from the
offering are $6125 [$85.79 per share dines 71.39 shares]; and (5) the net proceeds from the
offering are $4900 [.8 times $6125].
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issued shares; 102 this means a new investment of $980 (11.42 shares
times a market price of $85.79 per share). Group 1 shareholders will
therefore take the cost of compensating objectors into account in
deciding whether to undertake the risk-altering transaction: if, as here,
these costs ($980) are greater than the benefits to the Group 1 share-
holders (51 shares times a gain of $5 per share for a total of $255), the
Group 1 shareholders will vote against the risk-altering transaction,
thereby guaranteeing its defeat (since Group 1 investors own a majority
of the shares). So, by ensuring that objectors will be compensated for
their losses and placing the net cost of providing that compensation
on shareholders who otherwise gain, appraisal rights ensure that risk-
altering transactions will only be undertaken when they are value-in-
creasing. 1 °3
2. The Impact of Shareholder Access to Perfectly Competitive
Capital Markets
The problem that this article suggests appraisal rights are de-
signed to address—dealing with transactions whose effects on share-
holders differ depending on the shareholders' preferences for risk—
however, only arises when shareholders lack access to perfectly
competitive capital markets.'m When shareholders have access to per-
fectly competitive capital markets, financial theory tells us that all
shareholders will assess a risk-altering transaction according to the
same criterion: is the expected rate of return on the investment re-
quired for the risk-altering transaction greater than the opportunity
cost of capital, where the opportunity cost of capital is defined as the
rate of return on publicly traded securities that have the same risk as
the transaction under consideration. 105
 If the answer to this question
102 This will give the Group 1 shareholders a total of 62.42 of the 122.59 outstanding shares
after the new stock issuance, or 51% of the total.
105 1t should be noted that the benefits of appraisal rights come at a cost. Although appraisal
rights should prevent all risk-altering transactions that are value-decreasing, they can also be
expected to block some risk-altering transactions that arc value-increasing. This will happen if
the benefits to shareholders who gain from a risk-altering transaction exceed the costs to those
who lose, but these benefits are not sufficient to fully offset the net costs of compensating
objectors.
104 A perfectly competitive capital market is characterized by the following conditions:
(1) there are no barriers preventing access to the capital market and no participant is sufficiently
dominant as to have a significant effect on price; (2) access to the capital market is costless and
there are no frictions preventing the free trading of securities; (3) relevain information about
the price and quality of each security is widely and freely available; and (4) there are no distorting
taxes. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 16, at 22.
105 See id. at 14, 16, 17-24.
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is yes, then all shareholders will agree that the risk-altering transaction
makes them better off. lf, on the other hand, the answer is no, then
all will agree that the risk-altering transaction makes them worse off.
The explanation for these results follows.
If a new project offers a return for risk that is superior to the
market rate of return (and therefore leads to an increase in the market
price of the firm's shares), then even shareholders who personally
prefer the old combination of risk and return to the new will benefit
from the transaction. This is because these shareholders can sell their
shares at the increased market price which results when the new pro-
ject is undertaken, purchase a different investment that has the risk
and return features of the pre-transaction firm for a lower price, and
keep the difference for themselves.'" If, on the other hand, a new
project offers a return for risk that is less than the market rate of return
(and therefore leads to a decrease in the market price of the firm's
shares), then even those shareholders who personally prefer the new
combination of risk and return to the old will lose. This result follows
because, had the transaction not taken place, these shareholders could
have sold their shares for the higher pre-transaction market price,
purchased a new investment with risk and return characteristics of the
post-transaction firm for a lower price, and retained the difference as
profit.m7 Thus, when shareholders have access to perfectly competitive
capital markets, there is no possibility that differing personal tastes for
risk will result in differing shareholder preferences with respect to
risk-altering transactions. In other words, access to perfect capital mar-
kets ensures that all shareholders will benefit from transactions that
increase the market value of their shares and all will be harmed by
transactions that decrease the market value of their shares.'" There-
fore, under the preference reconciliation theory advanced in this arti-
cle, there is no potential problem for appraisal rights to address.
This result (i.e., identical shareholder preferences for risk-altering
transactions) however, only holds for perfectly competitive capital mar-
1 °(1 This result depends on the fact that access to perfectly competitive capital markets is
costless. See supra note 104 (setting forth the conditions that must be satisfied for capital mar kets
to be perfectly competitive). If access to capital markets is riot costless, then there is no guarantee
that investors will net a sufficient amount (after deducting access costs) from selling their post-
transaction shares to purchase new investments with the risk and return features of the pre-trans-
action firm. In other words, there is no guarantee that the net post-transaction sales price to
shareholders will exceed the pre-transaction market value of the firm's shares.
107 This result also depends on the fact that access to perfectly competitive capital markets is
costless. See supra note 106 (explaining impact of positive access costs).
"This result assumes that shareholders have no other interest in the uunsaction apart Fiona
their interests as shareholders.
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kets. If, instead, shares of a firm are traded in capital markets that are
even slightly imperfect, then the personal taste of investors for risk can
again become relevant in determining the value of the shares held
after a risk-altering transaction. Accordingly, a role for appraisal can
re-emerge. Consider, for example, a risk-increasing transaction that
offers a rate of return for risk that is superior to the opportunity cost
of capital and therefore increases the market value of a share (i.e., the
value of a share to the marginal investor). If capital markets are im-
perfect (e.g., access to such markets is costly), a rise in the marginal
(or market) value of shares will not necessarily translate into a net
post-transaction sales price that exceeds pre-transaction value. In other
words, if market imperfections are sufficiently large, the post-transac-
tion market value of shares minus the cost of accessing capital markets
may be less than the pre-transaction value of shares. Accordingly, there
is no guarantee that sales of post-transaction shares will generate suf-
ficient cash (net of transaction costs) to purchase new investments with
risk and return features of pre-transaction shares. More risk-averse
shareholders, who prefer the old combination of risk and return to the
new, may therefore be made worse off by risk-increasing transactions,
even though those transactions increase the market value of shares.
Meanwhile, less risk-averse shareholders may be made better off. A role
for appraisal under the preference reconciliation theory therefore
re-emerges. As markets more closely approach perfection, however, the
benefits from appraisal become smaller. This results because access to
capital markets, even imperfect ones, limits the losses that particular
shareholders might suffer as a result of risk-altering transactions. It,
therefore, reduces the likelihood that the losses from risk-altering
transactions will exceed the gains. 109
3. The Impact of Diversification by Shareholders
The need to reconcile differing shareholder preferences with
respect to risk-altering transactions also disappears if: (1) shareholders
109 For example, assume that in the example considered earlier, the market value of Firm A's
shares rose from $100 per share to $105 per share as a result of the risk-altering transaction. If
the transaction costs of accessing capital markets equaled 10% of the total sale price, then Group
2 shareholders, who personally preferred the old combination of risk and return to the new,
could sell their shares for a net price of $94.50 per share ($105 less $10.50 in transaction costs).
These shareholders would, of course, still be harmed by the risk-altering transaction, but the
harm would be reduced from $10 per share (in the earlier example where shareholders were
effectively precluded from accessing capital markets) to $5.50 per share. If transaction costs were
less than 10% of the total sales price, the harm suffered by Group 2 shareholders would be smaller
still, and the harm would disappear entirely as transaction costs dropped below 5%.
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hold investment portfolios that are sufficiently diversified to eliminate
the unique risk of their investments (i.e., investment portfolios which
include many other securities in addition to the shares in the firm
undergoing the risk-altering transaction); 110 and (2) a sufficient por-
tion of the securities in those investment portfolios are traded in
capital markets which investors can access at little or no cost. When
these two conditions are satisfied, a risk-altering transaction which
results in an increase in the market value of the firm's shares is certain
to make all shareholders better off, regardless of the shareholders'
personal preferences for risk. In these circumstances, investors who
dislike the impact of the risk-altering transaction on the risk and return
attributes of their investment portfolios can readjust their portfolios by
buying and selling securities of other firms until the risk and return
characteristics of their original portfolios are restored. In particular,
an investor can sell securities or combinations of securities that have
the same risk and return features as the post-transaction shares and buy
securities or combinations of securities that have the same risk and
return features as the pre-transaction shares. This series of transactions
should restore the risk and return attributes of the investor's pre-trans-
action portfolio. At the same time, it should leave the investor better
off than if the risk-altering transaction had never taken place because:
(1) the securities the investor sells in order to rebalance her portfolio
(securities with the risk and return characteristics of the post-transac-
tion shares) have a higher market value than the securities the investor
purchases (ones with risk and return features of the pre-transaction
shares);''' and (2) the transaction costs of trading securities are as-
sumed to be negligible. Accordingly, when the two conditions noted
at the beginning of this subsection are satisfied, risk-altering transac-
tions that increase the market value of a firm's shares are certain to
make all shareholders better off, even if the particular shares affected
by the risk-altering transaction cannot be easily sold in capital markets.
So appraisal rights need not be provided to ensure that the gains to
some shareholders more than offset the losses to others.
110 See supra note 16 for a definition of unique risk.
111 Note, in this regard, that we have assumed the risk-altering transaction increases the
market value of the firtit's shares (Le., that shares with the risk and return features of the
post-transaction firm have a higher market value than shares with the risk and return features of
the pre-transaction firm). This assumption semis reasonable because: (l) managers are con-
strained by market and legal forces to act consistently with shareholder interests (i.e., to pursue
value-increasing transactions, rather than value-decreasing ones); and (2) owners of a majority
of the firm's shares cannot be expected to approve transactions that result in a decrease in share
value.
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Consequently, a role for appraisal in cases involving firms with
shareholders who lack effective access to capital markets only remains
if either of the two conditions noted at the beginning of this subsection
are not satisfied—i.e., if (1) shareholders fail to hold investment port-
folios that are sufficiently diversified to eliminate the unique risk of
the investment in the firm undergoing the risk-altering transaction, or
(2) a sufficient portion of the securities in the shareholders' portfolios
are not traded in capital markets that investors can access at little or
no cost. In fact, this may frequently be the case. Investors who hold
shares that cannot be easily sold in capital markets (such as shares of
a closely held family business) will often have a substantial portion of
their wealth invested in those shares. As a result, these investors may
not be sufficiently diversified to eliminate the unique (or firm-specific)
risk of their investments. When this occurs, there can be no guarantee
of a portfolio readjustment strategy that will leave the investor better
off than if the risk-altering transaction had never taken place. First, if
the investor has a disproportionate amount of her wealth invested in
unmarketable securities of a firm undergoing a risk-altering transac-
tion, it may not be possible for the investor to fully offset the effects of
the risk-altering transactions by changing the ways in which her re-
maining wealth is invested. Second, even if readjustment is possible,
the costs of readjustment may well exceed the gains. This is because
many of the trades necessary to readjust portfolio risk of an undiver-
sified portfolio will be designed solely to readjust the unique risk of that
portfolio. These trades, however, are sure to generate net losses for
investors, because securities with the same market risk, but different
unique risk, will sell for the same price. 12
 So the trades designed to
adjust unique risk will produce no trading gains to offset their positive
transaction costs.
The result, then, is that the costs of readjusting the portfolio's
unique risk may more than offset the benefits from readjusting a port-
folio's market risk. Accordingly, the possibility of rebalancing a portfolio
after a risk-altering transaction does not eliminate the risk that some
shareholders will benefit from risk-altering transactions, while others
will lose. A role for appraisal in reconciling differing shareholder
preferences with respect to the risk-altering transaction therefore re-
mains.
112 see BREALEY	 MYERS, supra note 16, at 179-83 (explaining the Capital Asset Pricing
Model which posits that a security's price depends only on the security's sensitivity to marker risk).
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4. The Costs of Appraisal
The benefits of appraisal in ensuring that risk-altering transactions
produce net gains in cases where shareholders lack access to perfectly
competitive capital markets, of course, come at a cost. As explained
above,'" although appraisal rights should prevent all risk-altering trans-
actions that are value-decreasing, they can also be expected to block
some risk-altering transactions that are value-increasing. This will hap-
pen if the benefits to shareholders who gain from a risk-altering trans-
action exceed the costs to those who lose, but these benefits are not
sufficient to fully offset the net costs of compensating objectors. In
addition, since the number of shareholders who will seek appraisal
(and therefore the amount of cash which must be raised) cannot be
easily predicted in advance, appraisal rights introduce new uncertainty
into the job of planning corporate transactions. So if the preference
reconciliation theory of appraisal is correct, appraisal rights should
only be available in those circumstances where the gains from appraisal
are relatively large; namely, where transactions have a substantial im-
pact on the risk of a firm's shares and the impediments blocking
shareholder access to capital markets are large.
5. Summary
The foregoing thus provides a new theoretical explanation for
appraisal rights. Under this theory, appraisal rights are designed as a
vehicle for reconciling conflicts among shareholders with differing
preferences for risk, conflicts which exist even when managers act in
accordance with their fiduciary duties to shareholders by only approv-
ing transactions that result in increases in the market value of the
firm's shares.'" Accordingly, this theory (unlike competing theories
which view appraisal simply as a check on misconduct by managers or
controlling shareholders) carves out for appraisal a function that the
law of fiduciary duties does not, and cannot, serve: ensuring that
transactions, which have differing effects on shareholders depending
on their personal preferences for risk, produce net gains for sharehold-
ers. n5
113 See suIrra note 103.
114 Note, in this regard, that the principal example in Part II.A.I involved a risk-altering
transaction which resulted in an increase in the market value of the firm's shares but nonetheless
resulted in net losses fur shareholders as a group.
115 To handle this problem in a breach of fiduciary duty action, the court would have to
calculate the difference between pie- and post-vansaction values for each of the firm's sharehold-
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B. Consistency of the Preference Reconciliation Theory with the Basic
Features of Appraisal
Despite the advantages of the preference reconciliation theory
over its competitors, one basic empirical question remains: are the
terms of traditional appraisal statutes consistent with the theory? An
examination of the principal features of appraisal statutes suggests that
the answer is yes.
1. Appraisal Triggers
As noted earlier, appraisal rights are typically triggered by mergers,
sales of all or substantially all the firm's assets (other than in connec-
tion with dissolutions) and "serious" charter amendments, such as
those that alter the corporation's fundamental purposes. Each of these
transactions poses a significant risk of substantially altering the risk of
the firm's shares: a merger will alter the risk of the firm's shares if, for
instance, the merger partner's sensitivity to market risk is very different
from the original firm's; a sale of all (or substantially all) the firm's
assets will alter the risk of the firm's shares if the proceeds of the sale
are invested in assets that differ markedly from those sold; and a
charter amendment will result in the alteration of the share risk if, for
example, it authorizes the firm to engage in businesses that are very
different from those authorized in the original charter." 6
At the same time, transactions that pose a lesser risk of substan-
tially altering share risk are commonly excluded from the triggering
provisions of the appraisal statutes. For instance, most appraisal stat-
utes contain a provision similar to Delaware General Corporation Law
section 251(f), 17
 which denies appraisal rights to the acquiror's share-
holders when a merger leaves the acquiror's shareholders with at least
5/6th of the equity of the firm surviving the merger. This is logical
because such an allocation of shares suggests that the surviving firm
Cr!. This could be expected to result in a proceeding of enormous complexity because in instances
where appraisal rights are triggered (i.e., where transactions have a substantial impact on the risk
of the firm's shares and impediments blocking shareholder access to capital markets are large),
the post-transaction value of a share can be expected to vary from investor to investor depending
on the particular investor's taste for risk. So a separate calculation would have to be made for
each of the firm's shareholders. As is explained in Sub-Part 11.13.4 below, the appraisal action
overcomes this problem by providing for a buy-out remedy, rather than a damages remedy.
116
 Gilson also argues that appraisal-triggering transactions are characterized by their capacity
to alter the risk (specifically, the market risk) of the firm's shares. See supra note 84 and
accompanying text.
117 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 10.
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does not differ greatly from the acquiring firm and therefore the
transaction did not greatly alter the risk of the acquiror's shares.
Similarly, most appraisal statutes that grant appraisal rights to the
shareholders of a firm that sells all (or substantially all) its assets deny
appraisal rights to shareholders of the purchasing firm. This distinction
is also consistent with the theory. Shareholders of the selling firm may
see one group of assets completely replaced by another if, for instance,
the proceeds of the sale are used to invest in an entirely new line of
business. A substantial alteration in share risk is therefore quite possi-
ble. Shareholders of the purchasing firm, however, are less likely to see
the risk of their shares substantially altered. This is because the pur-
chasing firm's existing assets are combined with new assets, rather than
being completely replaced by them.
Finally, as expected, most appraisal statutes withdraw appraisal
rights in connection with dissolutions." 8 Dissolutions will ordinarily
take the form of a sale of the corporation's assets followed by a distri-
bution to the firm's stockholders of the cash remaining after all the
firm's creditors have been paid. A transaction, like the ordinary disso-
lution, which provides each shareholder with an identical amount of
cash per share presents no risk of affecting shareholders differently
depending on their preferences for risk, since each shareholder will
attach the same value to the consideration (i.e., cash) received for their
shares. Accordingly, under the preference reconciliation theory, there
is no problem for appraisal rights to address." 9
2. The Market Out
Most appraisal statutes now provide for a market out. Under the
earliest versions of the market out, which appeared in the 1960s,
appraisal rights were withdrawn with respect to shares that were listed
on a national securities exchange, such as the New York Stock Ex-
change, or that were held of record by more than 2000 holders. More
recent versions of the market out go even further, extending the
market out to shares that are traded on the NASDAQ Stock Market.' 2°
The emergence and subsequent expansion of the market out is
perfectly consistent with the preference reconciliation theory set forth
in this article. As noted earlier, the benefits from appraisal become less
substantial as capital markets approach perfection. In the 1890s, when
118 See Maiming, supra note 5, at 250-51.
119 For an explanation of why Delaware nonetheless provides for appraisal rights in connec-
tion with cash-out mergers, see infra Part 11.13.7.
140 See, e.g., DEL. CODE A. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1).
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appraisal rights first appeared without market outs, public securities
markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange, were far from perfect.
Accordingly, appraisal rights offered large gains, even for firms whose
securities were traded in those markets. By the 1960s, national securi-
ties exchanges had achieved much higher levels of efficiency. As a
result, the gains from appraisal rights for firms whose shares were
traded on those securities exchanges became considerably smaller in
relation to the costs and a market out withdrawing appraisal rights for
those shares emerged. In more recent years, the efficiency of public
securities markets, including the principal over-the-counter markets,
has continued to increase. The continued expansion of the market out,
to include securities traded in the NASDAQ Stock Market, can be
understood as a reflection of the increasing efficiency of these markets.
3. Valuation Rules
Appraisal statutes typically provide that shareholders who opt for
appraisal be awarded the pre-transaction value of their securities. This
is exactly the result one would expect if, as is argued here, the goal of
appraisal is to ensure the gains from appraisal-triggering transactions
exceed the losses. As explained above, awarding objecting sharehold-
ers the pre-transaction value of their shares has the effect of shifting
to the firm's other shareholders the cost of compensating objectors for
the losses they suffer as a result of the risk-altering transaction. Accord-
ingly, this valuation measure ensures that shareholders will vote in
favor of a risk-altering transaction only if the gains to shareholders
exceed the costs of making the losers whole.
By contrast, a valuation measure which gives objectors more than
pre-transaction value—such as a measure that gives objectors a share of
the gains that result from risk-altering transactions—risks impeding
value-increasing corporate transactions, because a higher price per
share for objectors translates into a higher net cost to the corpora-
tion of compensating objectors through appraisal. This, in turn, cre-
ates a greater risk that the net cost of compensating objectors will
exceed the gains to non-objecting shareholders, thus leading non-ob-
jecting shareholders to vote against the transaction even though gains
to shareholders from the risk-altering transaction exceed losses. For
example, assume a transaction increases the market value of the firm's
100 outstanding shares from $100 per share to $105 per share, but the
owners of 49 of the firm's shares dissent from the transaction because
they believe it decreases the value of their shares from $100 to $99
dollars. If the appraiser ordered that the dissenters be paid $105 per
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share, rather than the pre-transaction value of $100 per .share, the
transaction might nonetheless be defeated even though it clearly pro-
duces net gains for the shareholders. This would result if the transac-
tion costs of issuing new shares in order to get the cash necessary to
compensate objectors amounted to more than 4.72% of the gross
proceeds of the offering, since the net costs of compensating objectors
under those circumstances would more than offset the $255 gain (i.e.,
51 shares times $5 per share) non-objecting shareholders expected to
receive from the transaction.'''
4. Form of the Remedy
Appraisal statutes uniformly provide for a buy-out of the objectors'
shares rather than an award of damages in amount sufficient to com-
pensate objectors for their losses. Like the other aspects of appraisal
statutes already considered, the form of the remedy is easily explained
if, as argued above, appraisal is designed to ensure that the gains from
risk-altering transactions exceed the losses. To effectively implement a
damages remedy that would serve this purpose, a court would have to
calculate the difference between pre- and post-transaction values for
each objecting shareholder. This could be expected to result in a
proceeding of enormous complexity for at least two reasons. First, in
instances where appraisal rights are triggered (i.e., where transactions
have a substantial impact on the risk of the firm's shares and impedi-
ments blocking shareholder access to capital markets are large), the
post-transaction value of a share can be expected to vary from investor
to investor depending on the particular investor's taste for risk.'" Thus,
a separate damages calculation would have to be undertaken for each
objecting shareholder. Second, as Kanda and Levmore note, "if ap-
praisal is meant somehow to account for [subjective] values, then
appraisers are faced with a terribly difficult valuation problem, because
12I To net the $5145 necessary to compensate objectors (49 shares dines $105 per share)
after paying transaction costs equal to 4.72% of the offering, the company would have to sell new
shares with a total market value of $5400 ($5400 minus 4.72% of $5400 equals $5145). This means
the company would have to sell new investors 51.43% of the company (51.43% of 10,500 equals
$5400). The net cost to the company of making such an offering is equal to: (1) the market value
of the new shares sold ($5400) minus (2) the market value of shares repurchased from objectors
(49 times $105 per share or $5145), or $255. This net cost exactly offsets the gain that non-ob-
jecting shareholders would have received absent the exercise by objectors of appraisal rights (51
dines S5 per share or $255). So if transaction costs exceed 4.72%, the majority of the firm's
shareholders can be expected to vote against the transaction even though it offers net gains to
shareholders in the absence of appraisal rights.
124 See supra Par t II.A.
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no objective evidence exists regarding an individual's subjective valu-
ation."' 23
A buy-out remedy, on the other hand, achieves the goal of com-
pensating objectors for the losses they suffer with relative ease. To
implement a buy-out remedy, a court need only calculate the pre-trans-
action value of the firm's shares, a task which should be relatively
simple in the ordinary case since pre-transaction value can be deter-
mined by reference to the market price of the firm's shares before the
announcement of the triggering transaction.'" Unlike the damages
alternative, no calculation of subjective, post-transaction values is re-
quired. Admittedly, a buy-out remedy suffers from the disadvantage of
requiring a corporation to raise more cash than a damages remedy.
But this disadvantage of a buy-out remedy is relatively minor when
compared with the extreme calculation problems posed by the dam-
ages alternative.
5. Appraisal Exclusivity
Appraisal statutes (or court decisions interpreting those statutes)
traditionally provide that the availability of an appraisal remedy in con-
nection with a particular transaction does not preclude a shareholders'
suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty from being maintained in con-
nection with the same transaction.' 25
 This, too, is consistent with the
preference reconciliation theory of appraisal. The breach of fiduciary
duty action is designed to ensure that corporate decisionmakers—be
135
	 & I.evrnore, supra note 13, at 439.
124 cf. Manning, supra note 5, at 232 (noting that, at least where widely traded shares are
concerned, "courts [in appraisal proceedings] have virtually refused to go beyond an inquiry as
to the market price on the date determined to be relevant"). Pre-transaction value should be the
same for all shareholders because shareholders who elect to invest in a particular type of firm
(rather than having that investment forced upon them by directors and/or other shareholders)
should have relatively homogenous expectations regarding firm value. See Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 44, at 726-27 (noting that "[1]nvestors can make mutually beneficial trades until those
holding any given firm's stock have reasonably homogeneous expectations about its perform-
ance").
125 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 43; see also LA-rrix, supra note 4, at § 162. BM cf.
Thompson, supra note 3, at 24 (noting that courts in twelve states have held appraisal to be
exclusive). In Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court
held that, in the absence of fraud or illegality, the appraisal remedy would "ordinarily" be
exclusive. But since Weinberger, the Delaware courts have routinely interpreted the exception to
appraisal exclusivity broadly. See, e.g., Rabkin v. P.A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985)
(permitting plaintiffs to proceed with a breach of fiduciary duty action where defendants were
"charged with bad faith which goes beyond issues of 'mere inadequacy of price"). Indeed, in the
decade following Weinberger, there were at least eleven reported Delaware decisions applying the
fair dealing/fiduciary duty standard in cases where appraisal rights were available. SeeThompson,
supra note 3, at 24 Sc 11.102.
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they directors or controlling shareholders—have acted consistently
with their duties to the firm's shareholders. In the context of arms-
length transactions (such as a sale of the corporation to an unaffiliated
firm), this duty ordinarily requires corporate decisionmakers to strive
to obtain the best price reasonably attainable, 126 not simply a price that
exceeds the pre-transaction market value of the firm's shares.' 27 In the
context of a conflict of interest transaction (such as a sale of the
corporation to its controlling shareholder), this duty generally trans-
lates into an obligation to treat minority shareholders "fairly," 128 a duty
which may or may not require the sharing of gains with minority
shareholders. 12gAn appraisal action that is designed—as the preference
reconciliation theory predicts—to ensure that gains from risk-altering
transactions exceed losses does little to advance these goals. As the dis-
cussion above explains, such an appraisal action only ensures that ap-
praisal-triggering' transactions are value-increasing it does not ensure
that triggering transactions are value-maximizing—that is, that net
gains are as large as possible. Nor will an appraisal action designed in
accordance with the preference reconciliation theory adequately pro-
tect minority shareholders from unfair treatment by majority share-
holders, since the pre-transaction value awarded to objectors will nec-
essarily reflect the potential for unfair actions by the majority.
Accordingly, since an appraisal remedy designed to reconcile differing
shareholder preferences with respect to risk-altering transactions can-
not ensure that corporate decisionmakers act in accordance with their
fiduciary duties to shareholders, the traditional view—that the avail-
ability of appraisal does not preclude a breach' of fiduciary duty ac-
tion—is entirely logical.m
126 See, e.g., Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
127 Cf. Smith v. Van Cot koni, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding that directors breached their
fiduciary duty to the shateholders in connection with the sale or the company, even though a
sale price of S55 per share represented a 48% premium over the stock's last closing price).
128 See generally RtasTEIN & LETSOU, sutra note 32, § 9.04.
129 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996) (suggesting that the sharing
of gains with minority shareholders may be required in at least some cases).
139 By the same token, the availability of a bleach of fiduciary duty action should not (and
does riot) preclude the exercise of appraisal rights. As is explained above, the breach of fiduciary
duty action is designed to ensure that corporate decisionmakers get the best price reasonably
attainable for the shareholders—that is, to ensure that corporate transactions are value-maximiz-
ing. But, as Part II.A. explains, in circumstances where shareholders lack effective access to capital
markets, actions that maximize the market value of a firm's shares may not necessarily be
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6. Appraisal Procedures
Finally, the appraisal remedy is marked by a number of procedural
rules that distinguish it from the more common shareholders' deriva-
tive suit or class action. These include: (1) the obligation of individual
shareholders expressly to opt-in to an appraisal action; (2) the cum-
bersome procedures for perfecting appraisal rights; and (3) the desig-
nation of the corporation as the respondent in the action, The discus-
sion that follows reconciles these rules with the preference
reconciliation theory of appraisal developed in this article.
a. Opt-In
Appraisal statutes typically permit only those shareholders who
expressly elect appraisal (in the manner provided in the state appraisal
statute) to share in the statutory remedy. These rules are in marked
contrast to those governing shareholders' derivative suits and class
actions, which permit shareholders to automatically share in judg-
ments even if they fail to take any formal steps to join the action.'"
The opt-in nature of the appraisal remedy is entirely consistent
with the preference reconciliation theory of appraisal outlined above.
Under this theory, the appraisal remedy is designed to deal with trans-
actions that have differing impacts on different shareholders depend-
ing on their personal preferences for risk—i.e., transactions that make
some shareholders better off, while leaving others worse off. Conse-
quently, there is no reason to infer from the filing of an appraisal
action by one shareholder that all others (or indeed any others) wish
to pursue the remedy. In fact, one would expect just the opposite: those
shareholders who feel they have been made better off by the transac-
tion (i.e., those who feel that the post-transaction value of their shares
exceeds the pre-transaction value) will wish to retain their shares rather
than sell them back to the corporation for their pre-transaction value.
value-increasing—that is, where shareholders lack effective access to capital markets, some share-
holders may be harmed by transactions that increase the market value of the firm's shares and
these losses may well exceed the gains realized by others. So appraisal rights are not made obsolete
by the availability of an action for breach of fiduciary duty. In short, as was noted earlier, under
the view of appraisal rights advanced herein, appraisal and the law of fiduciary duties serve
completely separate and distinct functions. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
131 In a successful derivative suit, damages are paid to the corporation, not to the individual
shareholder plaintiffs. So all shareholders share in the benefit that a derivative action produces
through an increase in the value of their shares. See generally RIBSTEIN & LETSOIl, supra note 32,
at 574.
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By contrast, a shareholders' derivative suit or class action alleging
breach of fiduciary duty is based on the claim that the firm's managers
could have taken steps to make Ithe challenged transaction even more
favorable to the corporation. If that claim is correct, then the value of
all the firm's shares has been depressed by the managers' actions. All
shareholders could therefore be expected to join in the action, assum-
ing, of course, that the expected benefits to shareholders from pursu-
ing the action exceed the expected costs. Accordingly, there is little
reason to adopt an appraisal-like opt-in procedure which requires all
shareholders to affirmatively state that they wish to join the derivative
suit. This is particularly true if procedural rules ensure that share-
holder derivative suits and class actions will not proceed when they are
contrary to shareholder interests.'"
b. Perfecting Appraisal Rights
Appraisal statutes typically set forth a complicated and cumber-
some procedure for perfecting appraisal rights. Each shareholder seek-
ing appraisal must first notify the corporation of that desire before the
triggering transaction. Then, when the time for voting on the transac-
tion arrives, the shareholder must vote no or abstain from voting.
Finally, the shareholder must file a petition requesting appraisal with
the appropriate court within a relatively short period of time following
the consummation of the triggering transaction. Failure to take any of
the appropriate steps at the appropriate times can result in the share-
holder's losi of the remedy, even if the court ultimately determines the
fair value of the firm's shares in connection with a properly perfected
appraisal action commenced by a different shareholder. These rules
have been frequently criticized as unduly burdensome,'" but the pref-
erence reconciliation theory of appraisal suggests some good explana-
tions for their adoption.
i. Pre-Vote Notification
Pre-vote notification serves the purpose of informing managers
and shareholders of the maximum number of shares that might seek
appraisal rights in connection with a particular transaction. This infor-
InFor a discussion of procedural rules that screen out "bad" derivative suits, see RIBSTEIN
& LEssou, supra note 32, at §§ 10.03-10.05.
133 See, e.g., 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE, Supra note 1, pt. VII, at 296 ("the proce•
dines surrounding the exercise of the appraisal remedy have long been viewed as so cumbersome
and time-consuming as to deter all but the largest and most determined shareholders"); Seligman,
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mation can then be used to determine the maximum cost to the
corporation of compensating objectors)" With this cost calculated,
managers and shareholders can better determine, before a vote is
taken, whether the potential gains to shareholders from an appraisal-
triggering transaction will more than offset the net costs of compen-
sating objectors. Consequently, appraisal is more likely to achieve its
goal of preventing risk-altering transactions that impose net costs on
shareholders. For if, as a result of the pre-vote notification procedure,
managers and shareholders determine that the benefits to non-object-
ing shareholders will be less than the net costs to the corporation of
compensating objectors, either the firm's managers can abandon the
transaction in advance of the vote (thus saving the expenses associated
with a full-blown proxy solicitation), or shareholders not seeking ap-
praisal 'rights can vote against the transaction, thereby ensuring its
defeat. Without any pre vote notification of objector intentions, man-
agers and shareholders would face considerable uncertainty in decid-
ing upon appraisal-triggering transactions. As a result, some risk-alter-
ing transactions that imposed net costs on shareholders might be
approved, while others that provided net benefits could be defeated.
ii. Voting by Objectors
When the time for a vote on the appraisal-triggering transaction
arrives, shareholders planning to assert appraisal rights with respect to
their shares must ordinarily vote "no" or abstain from voting. (Since
transactions that trigger appraisal rights typically require an affirmative
vote of a majority of all the outstanding shares, an abstention is the
functional equivalent of a "no" vote.) The reason for this voting rule
was suggested earlier.' 35
 Without such a rule, shartholders who would
be harmed by a risk-altering transaction if they had to retain their
shares might nonetheless be tempted to vote in favor of the transaction
so as to increase the likelihood of gaining an opportunity to liquidate
their investment)s 6
 As a result, risk-altering transactions could often be
approved even though the losses to shareholders from those transac-
supra note 3, at 829 (noting that "the costs, risks and time delays of an appraisal usually dissuade
all but the wealthiest of plaintiffs from demanding a valuation").
134 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
135 See supra note 100.
136 This temptation is particularly strong in the case of appraisal-triggering events because,
as noted earlier, the appraisal remedy is only available in instances where shareholders lack
effective access to capital markets—i.e., when shareholders hold relatively illiquid investments.
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dons exceed the gains. A rule requiring objectors to either vote "no"
or abstain from voting eliminates this risk.
iii. The Appraisal Petition
In addition to notifying the corporation of his or her intention
and then voting "no" (or abstaining from voting) on the triggering
transaction, the shareholder seeking appraisal must typically file a
petition requesting appraisal with the appropriate court within a rela-
tively short period of time after the triggering transaction—e.g., 120
days under Delaware law. The speed with which an appraisal action
must be filed is difficult to explain if, as many of the theories discussed
in Part I suggest, appraisal is designed to deter misconduct by manag-
ers or controlling shareholders. This difficulty arises because sufficient
evidence of wrongdoing to justify the costs and risks of pursuing an
appraisal action may not be discovered within the short time period
provided for filing a petition.
A short petition period, however, poses few, if any, problems to
the preference reconciliation theory of appraisal. Under this theory,
shareholders considering the exercise of appraisal rights need only
answer one question: are the risk and return attributes of the post-
transaction firm (assuming the transaction is consummated in the
manner described by the firm's managers) less desirable than the risk
and return attributes of the pre-transaction firm? In answering this
question, shareholders need not concern themselves with investigating
the accuracy of management's statements since shareholders will have
a separate remedy if managerial misstatements lead to incorrect deci-
sions regarding appraisal rights.'" Nor must shareholders concern
themselves with the question of whether managers might have ob-
tained a better deal for the shareholders with greater effort or dili-
gence since, should evidence of managerial misconduct arise, objectors
should be able to commence a separate action for breach of fiduciary
duty.'" Accordingly, shareholders should be able to decide whether to
exercise appraisal rights relatively quickly by discounting the firm's
expected returns at the appropriate rate given their personal tastes for
risk.
137 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 43 (noting that even those statutes that make the appraisal
remedy exclusive ordinatily contain exceptions that "clearly preserve a shareholder's action for
a direct misreptesentation that leads to failure to exercise appraisal rights").
' 38 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 Pad. 1182 (Del. 1988) (permitting share-
holder who had commenced an appraisal action to commence a breach of fiduciary duty action
when credible evidence of managerial misconduct was uncovered).
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c. Corporation as Defendant
An appraisal action is prosecuted against the corporation, rather
than against the firm's managers. If appraisal is viewed as a device for
policing managerial misconduct, this aspect of the remedy, like many
others discussed earlier, is difficult to explain. For instance, if as Gilson
suggests, appraisal rights are designed to prevent managers from sell-
ing the firm's assets for too low a price, why not require the managers
(or their liability insurers) to pay over the incremental amounts that
would have been obtained by more aggressive bargaining rather than
requiring a payment by the corporation to those (few) shareholders
who have been lucky enough to properly perfect their appraisal rights?
Requiring the firm's managers to come up with a greater amount of
cash from their own pockets would undoubtedly prove a more effective
deterrent than requiring a smaller payment out of corporate funds.'"
If, however, the goal of appraisal is to ensure that the gains from
risk-altering transactions exceed the losses, as the preference reconcili-
ation theory suggests, then requiring the corporation to purchase the
petitioning investors' shares makes perfect sense. As explained earlier,
requiring the corporation to repurchase objectors' shares has the ef-
fect of forcing shareholders who otherwise gain from risk-altering
transactions to bear the net costs of compensating those who lose. It
therefore ensures that shareholder approval for risk-altering transac-
tions will only be forthcoming when those transactions are wealth-in-
creasing.
7. The Cash-Out Exception to the Market Out
While the preference reconciliation theory effectively explains
most common features of appraisal, it does have one notable flaw: it
fails to explain the cash-out exception to the market out. The market
out to appraisal generally withdraws appraisal rights from an objector
whose shares are publicly traded. Under the cash-out exception to the
market out, however, appraisal rights will ordinarily be restored if the
objector is required to accept, in exchange for his or her shares,
anything other than shares of the surviving corporation in a merger,
shares of a publicly traded corporation, cash in lieu of fractional shares
or some combination of the foregoing. ' 40
 Thus, if a merger calls for an
139 Cf Thompson, supra note 3, at 46 ("If the plaintiff claims that individual defendants
shuffled money out of the corporation to benefit themselves and reduce the value of the
corporation, the Delaware court has said that individuals are the proper defendants, not the
corporation.").
14°See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Lit. 8, § 262(b)(2). The text of the cash-out exception to the
market out is reprinted supra at note 36.
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objector's publicly traded shares to be converted into cash, the cash-out
exception to the market out ensures that appraisal rights will continue
to be available.
The cash-out exception to the market out cannot be explained by
the preference reconciliation theory outlined above. Under that the-
ory, appraisal rights are designed to deal with transactions whose ef-
fects on shareholders differ depending upon the shareholders' prefer-
ences for risk (i.e., transactions where different shareholders attach
different values to the consideration received in exchange for their
pre-transaction shares, depending on their preferences for risk). A
transaction which provides each shareholder with an identical amount
of cash per share simply does not fall into that category, since all
investors will attach the same value to the cash received in exchange
for their shares."' Thus, assuming shareholders have no private inter-
ests in the appraisal-triggering transaction apart from their interests as
shareholders, there is no risk that the cash-out merger could make
some shareholders better off, while leaving others worse off. Under the
preference reconciliation theory, appraisal rights should therefore be
denied."2
But while the preference reconciliation theory cannot, by itself,
explain the cash-out exception to the market out, the theory is not
undermined by the exception. First, as Thompson notes, the cash-out
exception to the market out is rare outside of Delaware.'" Therefore
any deviation from the theory constitutes the exception rather than
the rule. Second, as the discussion below explains, Delaware's adoption
of the cash-out exception to the market out can be readily explained,
albeit on different grounds than the rest of Delaware's appraisal stat-
ute.
The cash-out exception to the market out was added to the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law ("Delaware General Corporation Law")
(along with the market out itself) in 1967. Although Ernest Folk, the
141 Shareholders could, of course, have different views regarding the merits of the transaction
based on the impact of the transaction on their private interests. But the structure of appraisal
rights, particularly their focus on risk-altering transactions, shows that appraisal rights are not
designed to provide a solution to the problem of conflicting private interests of shareholders.
142 That appraisal statutes, like Delaware's, were originally adopted without exceptions for
cash-out transactions in no way undermines the preference reconciliation theory of appraisal.
When appraisal statutes first appeared in the late nineteenth century, cash-out transactions were
generally prohibited, see Thompson, supra note 3, at 19 (citing Carney, supra note 57, at 97),
except in connection with dissolutions where, as noted earlier, appraisal rights were typically
denied, see supra note 118 and accompanying text. So there was little reason to include general
exceptions coveting cash-outs in early appraisal statutes.
143 Thompson, supra note 3, at 30. See, e.g., iN D. CODE § 23-1-22-8 (1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 50.544 (1997).
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reporter for the Delaware Corporate Law Revision Committee, does
not explain the reason for the provision's adoption,'" its purpose
becomes clear when it is read in conjunction with (1) the Delaware
Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Stauffer v. Standard Brands, inc. 195
and (2) the 1967 modifications to Delaware General Corporation Law
section 251, the provision governing long-form mergers." 6 In Stauffer,
a minority shareholder challenged a short-form, cash-out merger com-
pleted under Delaware General Corporation Law section 253 on the
grounds that the cash provided to minority shareholders—$105 per
share—was so grossly inadequate as to constitute constructive fraud.
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, rejected the challenge. The
Court held that under the circumstances the appraisal remedy was
exclusive because, where "the real relief sought is the recovery of the
monetary value of the plaintiff's shares[,] . . . the statutory appraisal
provision provide[s] an adequate remedy." 147
 In reaching this result,
the Court did not anticipate (and therefore did not answer) the many
challenges to the adequacy of appraisal as a remedy for majority mis-
conduct."8
 Instead, the Court simply adopted the opinion of the Vice
Chancellor, which emphasized the differences in the statutory lan-
guage of Delaware General Corporation Law section 251, the long-
form merger provision, and section 253, the short-form merger provi-
sion. 149
 Delaware General Corporation Law section 251, the Vice
Chancellor noted, did not (at the time) authorize "majority stock-
holder[s] ... [to] eliminate minority stockholders as participants in
the continuing enterprise [by the payment of cash]."15° So minority
144 The cash-out exception to the market out is not even mentioned in Folk's report to the
committee. See FOLK, supra note 11, at 196-202 (1968) (discussing appraisal without considering
a cash-out exception to the market out). Folk did, however, explain the operation of the cash-out
exception to the market out in the first edition of his treatise on Delaware corporation law. See
ERNEST L. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
(1972).
149 87 A.2d 75 (Del. 1962).
146 A long-form merger is one that is completed by taking all the steps specified in Delaware
General Corporation Law section 251, including obtaining the approval of the directors and
shareholders of each merging corporation; a short-form merger, on the other hand, refers to a
merger between a parent and a subsidiary (at least 90% of the stock of which is owned by the
parent), which is completed following the abbreviated procedures specified in Delaware General
Corporation Law section 253.
147 187 A.2d at 80. Delaware had amended its short-form merger provision to allow the use
of cash in 1957. See Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 624, 648 (1981). When the Delaware legislature made this change, however, it did not
alter the appraisal statute to except the newly-authorized as a cash-out merger. Had it done so,
the issue in Stauffer would never have arisen.
148 See, e.g., supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
145
 See id.
15 Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 178 A.2d 311, 314 (Del. Ch. 1962).
September 19981	 THE ROLE OF APPRAISAL 	 1163
shareholders had to be provided with a remedy other than appraisal
in order to prevent objecting minority shareholders from being forced
to accept cash for their shares. In contrast, Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law section 253 expressly provided for the payment of cash in
short-form mergers. Accordingly, restricting dissenting shareholders in
short-form mergers to appraisal (i.e., forcing objecting shareholders to
accept cash for their shares) did not permit a result not contemplated
by the legislature.
Staufferwas a great victory for majority shareholders in short-form,
cash-out mergers under Delaware General Corporation Law section
253. As a result of Stauffer, majority shareholders in such mergers
would no longer have to defend themselves in breach of fiduciary duty
actions brought on behalf of all the firm's minority shareholders, but
would only have to defend themselves in appraisal proceedings
brought on behalf of the relatively few minority shareholders who
would successfully perfect their appraisal rights. Thus, it should not be
surprising that when in 1967 the corporate bar sought an expansion
of Delaware General Corporation Law section 251 to authorize long-
form, cash-out mergers,''' the corporate bar also sought to ensure that
minority shareholders challenging those mergers would be restricted
to an appraisal remedy.'" This goal, of course, could only be achieved
if minority shareholders in long-form, cash-out mergers under Dela-
ware General Corporation Law section 251 had access to the appraisal
remedy, a result that the cash-out exception to the market out en-
sured. 153
151 The expansion of Delaware General Corporation Law section 251 to allow the payment
of cash in exchange for the shares of a constituent corporation in a merger was proposed by
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown, Trautman & Emersen of San Francisco. See Foui, supra note 11, at
195—D.
152 This result may have been consistent with the interests of shareholders if the cost to the
firm of the existing fiduciary duty check on mergers exceeded the benefits. CI Ralph K. Winter
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 61 LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977)
(arguing that state chartering of corporations leads to a "race for the top" in corporate law, as
states compete with one another to provide managers with the ability to raise capital at the lowest
possible cost). The result, however, might simply have advanced the private interests of corporate
inariagers. Cf. Geoffrey P. Miller & Jonathan R. Macey, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 Thx. L. REV. 469 (1987) (using interest group theory to show that state
competition for corporate charters will sometimes produce laws that conflict with shareholder
interests).
' 53 This understanding of the cash-out exception to the market out is consistent with the
refusal of the 1967 Delaware Legislature to extend the mar ket out to short-form mergers under
Delaware General Corporation Law section 253, even though Folk apparently recommended that
course of action. See FOLK, supra note 11, at 193. The refusal to apply the market out to short-form
ruiners ensured that appraisal would continue to be the minority's exclusive remedy under
Stouffer when the majority used Delaware General Corporation Law section 253 to effect a
cash-out.
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The proponents of the cash-out exception to the market out
achieved their goal in 1971 when the Delaware Chancery Court ex-
tended the Stauffer appraisal-exclusivity rule to long-form mergers.' 54
That victory, however, proved to be short-lived.' 55 Thus, although the
cash-out exception to the market out initially appears to undermine
the preference reconciliation theory of appraisal, its adoption in Dela-
ware can be readily explained. 155
C. Consistency of Theory with History
The preference reconciliation theory of appraisal is also consis-
tent with much of the history of the remedy. As noted earlier, appraisal
statutes have long been defended as necessary to protect shareholders
from being forced to invest in fundamentally altered or, in effect, new
firms against their will. As Thompson notes, for example, a 1902
treatise explained appraisal rights as necessary "to give [the minority
shareholder] the privilege of selling out instead of embarking in the
new enterprise."' 57 The preference reconciliation theory explains why
shareholders might benefit if the majority's power to force the corpo-
ration to "embark[] on a new enterprise" is limited by appraisal rights,
particularly in circumstances where capital markets are not well devel-
oped. The preference reconciliation theory therefore is consistent with
the early justifications of the remedy.
In addition, the preference reconciliation theory of appraisal is
consistent with the timing of the adoption of appraisal statutes. Prior
to the adoption of the first appraisal statutes in the late 19th century,
shareholders could be assured that risk-altering transactions would not
154 See Davicil Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
155 See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977) (holding that courts "will
set untinize the circumstances [of a cash-out merger under § 251] for compliance with the Sterling
rule of 'entire fairness' and, if it finds a violation thereof, will grant such relief as equity may
require;" the court then concluded that "[ably statement in Stauffer inconsistent herewith is held
inapplicable to a § 251 merger"); see also Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979)
(extending Singer to short-form mergers under Delaware General Corporation Law section 253).
But see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (holding that "a plaintiff's
monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding
herein established") (emphasis added).
156 Others view the cash-out exception to the market as motivated by Finches concern about
majority oppression of the minority that is, as ensuring that shareholders will have access to an
appraisal remedy in cash-out mergers where the danger of majority misconduct is greatest. See
Thompson, supra note 3, at 30; see also Fischcl, supra note 12, at 885. This view, however, ignores
the fact that the original effect of the cash-out exception to the market out was to restrict minority
shareholders in cash-out mergers to a less effective remedy.
157 Thompson, supra note 3, at 18-19 ta.57 (quoting WALTER C. Novzs, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS § 51, at 84 (1902)).
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impose net losses on shareholders because, under 19th century doc-
trine, shareholders were viewed as having "vested rights" that pre-
vented firms froM affecting fundamental changes without the consent
of each and every shareholder.' 58 Such transactions could therefore
only go forward if all shareholders were made better off (and therefore
consented to the transaction) or if winners adequately compensated
losers. The vested rights approach to deterring value-decreasing trans-
actions, however, became increasingly costly in the late 19th century
as increases in the numbers of shareholders in firms made bargaining
with hold-outs more difficultly and as technological advances made
risk-altering transactions like mergers more desirable.'" As a result,
courts and legislatures began to alter the law (first with respect to
railroad corporations and then with respect to private corporations
generally), authorizing corporations to effect risk-altering transactions
such as mergers without obtaining unanimous shareholder consent. 161
As Thompson shows,' 62 the adoption of appraisal statutes generally
followed closely upon the abandonment of the unanimity rule, a result
which makes perfect sense if, as is argued here, appraisal rights serve
the same purpose as a shareholder veto: ensuring that the gains from
risk-altering transactions exceed the losses.'"
Finally, as the earlier discussion of the market out reveals, the
preference reconciliation theory of appraisal explains, at least in part,
the evolution of the appraisal remedy over time. In particular, the
theory explains the emergence of the appraisal right without a market
out in the late 19th century, the introduction of the market out in the
1960s and the continued expansion of the market out over the last
forty years.'"
/58 See Carney, supra note 57, at 79-81.
13° See Thompson, supra note 3, at 12 (citing HERBERT HOVENRAMP, ENTERPRISE AND &mar-
CAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 253 (1991)) (noting that "(1.]hroughout the 1880s, most manufacturing
firms were family owned or otherwise closely held"); see also Morton j. Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 209, 210 (1985) (stating
that railroads constituted the only group of large publicly held companies prior to 1890).
160 See Carney, supra note 57, at 79.
161 See id. at 79-97.
162 See Thompson, supra note 3, at 14-15.
163 Cf Weller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941) (explaining the lag between the
abandonment of the unanimity rule and the adoption of appraisal rights as follows: "[u]nanimous
shareholder consent was a prerequisite to fundamental changes . . . To meet the situation,
legislatures authorized . . . changes by majority vote. This, however, opened the door to victimi-
zation of the minority. To solve the dilemma, statutes permitting a dissenting minority to recover
the appraised value of its shares were widely adopted.").
164 See supra Part 11.112.
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By contrast, the theories of other commentators are quite difficult
to reconcile with the history of appraisal. Fischel, for instance, focuses
on the ability of appraisal rights to police situations where wealth
appropriation is more likely than wealth maximization, such as "when
shareholders of one firm attempt to exploit the coordination problems
of shareholders of another firm" by making a coercive, two-tiered
tender offer, or when a majority shareholder attempts to "confiscate
the pro rata share of the minority in a freeze-out merger."'" Two-tiered,
coercive tender offers, however, were unknown in the late 19th century
when appraisal rights first appeared and, as Thompson points out,
"[nineteenth century] limits on corporate authority and the judicial
use of fiduciary duty to check self-dealing [greatly] restricted the ma-
jority's ability to implement [freeze-out] transaction [s]." 166 Accord-
ingly, that appraisal was originally designed as a check on two-tiered
tender offers and minority freeze-outs seems doubtful.
Indeed, of the principal commentators criticizing the traditional
justification for appraisal, only Manning attempts to explain why ap-
praisal rights emerged in the late 19th century after the unanimity rule
for fundamental change was abandoned. 167 Manning suggests that
"early appraisal statutes [may have been] promoted by perspicacious
legislative agents of management, who saw in these statutes a way to
consolidate and liberate their own condition"—that is, as a way to
entice courts and legislatures "to soften the rigor of the [traditional]
judicial rule which protected the shareholder by requiring unanimous
shareholder approval [for fundamental corporate changes]." 168 Man-
ning further suggests that such enticement was necessary because of
the 19th century view that corporations were things that lived and died,
rather than mere forms of organization)" He therefore concludes that
courts and legislatures may not have permitted the abandonment of
the unanimity rule for legal traumas, like mergers (which involve the
death of a corporation), "serious" charter amendments and sales of
substantially all the firm's assets, without substituting some alternative
form of protection such as the appraisal remedy."°
165 See supra Part LA.
168 Thompsost, supra note 3, at 19 (citing Carney, supra note 57, at 97).
107
 Most commentators do not greatly concern themselves with the history of appraisal or
with reconciling their explanations of appraisal with traditional views of the remedy. Instead, most
commentators "have preferred to rebuild front first principles and to ask why appraisal has
survived in an evolving world and under what circumstances parties would bargain for it." Kanda
& Levrnore, supra note 13, at 431. Fischcl, Kanda and Levinore, and Gilson all arguably fall into
this camp.
16B Manning, supra note 5, at 228-29.
1139 See id. at 244-46.
170 See id. at 246-47.
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Manning's historical explanation for the emergence of appraisal
rights, however, has two principal flaws. First, because it views appraisal
statutes as part of an effort to escape the rigors of the traditional
unanimity rule, the theory suggests that appraisal statutes should gen-
erally have been adopted in tandem with statutes authorizing corpora-
tions to undertake mergers by less than a unanimous vote. The evi-
dence, however, shows that there was often a significant time lag
between the adoption of the two provisions, particularly with the ear-
liest appraisal statutes.' 71 Second, Manning's theory suggests that ap-
praisal rights should have been extended to all corporate transactions
that could be characterized as involving legal traumas for shareholders.
But, as Manning himself acknowledges, this never happened:
If it is serious surgery to change any part of the "corporation,"
it is much more serious to bring about its "death" by dissolu-
tion. By this logic, one might expect to find the appraisal
remedy available to the shareholder dissenting from dissolu-
tion. In fact, however, no statute provides for it."'
III. THE FUTURE OF APPRAISAL
If, as the preference reconciliation theory suggests, the purpose
of appraisal is to ensure that the gains from risk-altering transactions
exceed the losses, how—if at all—should modern appraisal statutes be
reformed? Several of the more popular proposals for reform of existing
appraisal statutes are discussed in Professor Thompson's 1995 article,
Exit, Liquidity and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Colo-rate Latu" 3
This Part argues that these reform proposals should be rejected be-
cause, among other things, they are based on a flawed view of the
purposes of appraisal.
In his article, Professor Thompson identifies all reported cases
involving appraisal rights for the ten-year period following the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,"4 the case
which ushered in the modern era of appraisal rights by, among other
171 See Thompson, supra now a, at 14 ("Appraisal statutes arc often presented as having been
enacted in tandem with statutes authorizing consolidation or merger by less than unanimous
vote, but there was a significant difference in the spread of the two statutes. By the turn of the
century, a dozen states had statutes authorizing consolidation for corporations generally, but only
live of those states had appraisal statutes.").,
172
 Manning, supra note 5, at '250 (emphasis added). By contrast, the preference reconcili-
ation theory is consistent with the denial of appraisal rights in connection with dissolutions. See
supra Part 11.13.1.
173 See Thompson, supra note 3.
174 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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things, modernizing the valuation standards for appraisal proceedings
in Delaware. He then categorizes the transactions involved in those
cases to determine the context in which appraisal most frequently
occurs. This analysis reveals that: (1) of the eighty identified transac-
tions, eighty percent involved cash-outs; (2) "the most frequently re-
curring context [for appraisal] .. was that of a majority shareholder
in a widely traded corporation seeking to force out the minority share-
holders;" and (3) "[On addition, there was a significant number of
cases in which a third party took over the corporation with a cash-out
as the second step of an acquisition of control from dispersed share-
holders." Thompson infers from this that Fischel's explanation of
appraisal—"as an implied contractual term that sets the minimum
price at which the firm . . . can be sold in situations where certain
groups are more likely to attempt to appropriate wealth from other
groups than to maximize the value of the firm" 176—best describes the
modern use of the remedy.'" Based on this conclusion, Thompson
endorses a number of popular reforms designed to ensure that ap-
praisal serves as an effective "check against opportunism by a majority
shareholder in . . . transactions [where] ... the majority forces minor-
ity shareholders . . . to accept cash for their shares."' 78 These reforms
include the following:
1. Eliminating the Market Out. 179
 Thompson suggests eliminating,
or at least limiting the expansion of, the market out. He argues that
the market out is inconsistent with the goal of checking opportunism
by majority shareholders because "the price in an efficient market will
provide no compensation for self-dealing."Im Thompson explains that
if those in control of a corporation propose a transaction that
is bad for the corporation but good for the other transacting
entity in which the controllers have a larger interest, the
market's reaction will send the price of the corporation's
shares lower, giving no protection against self-serving behav-
ior. 181
2. Altering Valuation Rules to Include Gains Attributable to the Trig-
gering Transaction. Thompson acknowledges that "[m] ost states define
fair value available in appraisal to exclude any appreciation or depre-
I " Thompson, supra note 3, at 25-26.
178 Fische!, WPM note 12, at 876.
3 " See Thompson, supra note 3, at 26-27.
3 " Id. at 4.
3 " See id. at 28-31.
380 Id. at 29.
"I Id. at 30 (citing Fische], supra note 12, at 885). If, however, a state should choose to retain
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ciation attributable to the [appraisal-triggering] transaction."' 85 This
rule, he suggests, made sense in traditional appraisal cases where the
dissenter was given the option of continuing in the "new" enterprise,
but did not exercise the option.' 85 But, Thompson argues, such a
valuation rule has no place in the vast majority of modern appraisal
cases which involve cash-outs. He reasons that, "[Of ... the minority
. is being forced out [in a cash-out transaction], perhaps because of
an anticipated increase in value that will only become visible after the
transaction, exclusion [of gains attributable to the transaction from an
appraisal award] can easily become a basis for oppression of the mi-
nority. ”184
3. Reforming Perfection Procedures. As noted above, state appraisal
statutes typically require that the shareholder seeking appraisal notify
the corporation of that desire before the triggering transaction, vote
"no" or abstain from voting when the transaction is presented and file
a petition requesting appraisal shortly after the triggering transaction
is completed. 185 Thompson argues that these procedures are "ill-suited"
to appraisal in the modern era because they "are a burden to full
recovery when the majority has decided to eliminate an entire group
of shareholders, and there is a common question about whether the
price is fair."188 He, therefore, suggests streamlining the traditional
perfection rules to facilitate shareholder access to the remedy. 187
4. Making the Appraisal Remedy Exclusive. Generally, those who view
appraisal as a device to check misconduct by majority shareholders
a market out, Thompson suggests restricting the 'mulct out by adopting a Delaware-like cash-out
exception to the market out. See id. In addition, Thompson argues against expanding the market
out to include NASDAQ stocks. See id at 30-31. Other commentators share Thompson's convic-
tion that the market out should be eliminated, at least in cases of transactions put forward by
majority shareholders. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, § 7.3; Mary Siegel, Back to the Future:
Appraisal Rights in the Twenly-First Century, 32 HARv. J. ON LEG1S. 79, 124-26 (1995).
l '92 Thompson, supra note 3, at 35-36,
1 " See id. at 36.
181 1d. Several other commentators agree that the traditional valuation rules preclude ap-
praisal from functioning as an effective check on majority misconduct. See, e.g., Brudney
Chirclstein, supra note 44, at 304-07; Vorenberg, supra note 44, at 1201-04. Fischel, however,
argues that the traditional rules, focusing on pre-nansactioar values, should be retained because
gain-sharing rules threaten to stifle value-increasing corporate transactions. See Fischel, supra note
12, at 886; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 44, at 709.
1 " See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
186 Thompson, supra note 3, at 41. For all explanation of how these perfection rules burden
full recovery by the minority, see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
I" Thompson, supra note 3, at 41. Among other things, Thompson recommends the adop-
tion of mules to facilitate appraisal class actions and the rejection of judicial decisions that interpret
procedural rules strictly, for instance, to require the dismissal of an appraisal action when notices
arrive "minutes or hours after the appointed time." Id. at 40. The call for simplified appraisal
perfection procedures goes back more than 30 years. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 5, at 260-62.
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favor making the appraisal remedy exclusive, at least so long as the
procedural problems that inhibit shareholder access to the remedy are
eliminated.' 88 They argue that, by ensuring that the majority pays a fair
price for the minority's shares, appraisal, by itself, functions as an
adequate check on majority misconduct. Thompson, for the most part,
agrees with this view. He writes that "[t] here is no inherent reason why
valuation could not emerge as a preferred response to monitoring
conflict transactions," like cash-out mergers, that are the focus of
modern appraisal proceedings. 189 But he notes that "[i] t is surprising
that courts are willing to permit appraisal as the sole check on conflict
when the remedy, as it currently exists, imposes so many procedural
steps on plaintiffs and uses pro-majority valuation standards." 9°
Thompson acknowledges that the reforms he suggests might not
fit with the original purpose of appraisal,'" which he identifies as
providing liquidity to the frozen-in shareholder after certain funda-
mental changes.'22
 But he finds this objection to reform unpersuasive
because Idequiring appraisal to perform two quite different func-
tions" might cause appraisal to perform "poorly" its more important,
and "theoretically more defensible,"'" job of policing conflicts.' 94
The analysis in this article, however, suggests that these proposals
for reform should be rejected. First, the proposals are based on a
flawed view of the purpose of appraisal rights as a check against op-
portunism by majority shareholders in transactions where the majority
forces the minority to accept cash for their shares. As the analysis in
the preceding Parts explains, this view of appraisal does not square
with the history of the retriedy, 195 nor can it explain the basic features
of appraisal.' 96
 Furthermore, as the discussion in Part I makes clear,'"
' 99 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 12, at 901-02.
1 " Thompson, supra note 3, at 45.
11111 1d. at 46 (emphasis added). As noted above, Fische] would differ with Thompson's
criticism of the valuation standards typically used in appraisal proceedings. See supra note 184.
191 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 3, at 28.
1" See id. at 4. Thompson's view that the original purpose of appraisal was to provide liquidity
to the frozen-in shareholder after certain fundamental changes is consistent with the view of
appraisal advanced in this paper. But the liquidity theory of appraisal is incomplete. Among other
things, it fails to explain why liquidity should be provided in such cases; it therefore provides no
theoretical basis for determining such matters as (1) the types of corporate transactions that
should trigger appraisal rights, (2) the applicable standards of valuation, and (3) whether the
appraisal remedy should be exclusive.
1" Id.
'94 See id. at 34.
195 See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
196 See supra Part I.A.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
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a majority-checking purpose for appraisal is unnecessary given the
existence of breach of fiduciary duty actions that require majority
shareholders to carry the burden of establishing the fairness of chal-
lenged transactions to minority shareholders; these actions serve the
same function that Thompson and others assign to appraisal rights,
but do so more effectively because, among other reasons, they lack the
features (e.g., cumbersome perfection procedures and market outs)
that often make appraisal rights difficult or impossible to exercise.
True, a number of states, including Delaware, have undercut the
fiduciary duty check on majority misconduct by (mistakenly) providing
that appraisal ordinarily should be the exclusive remedy in cases like
cash-out mergers.'" But the solution to this mistake is not to transform
the appraisal remedy into a breach of fiduciary duty action (as the
proposals above suggest), but rather is to simply repeal the appraisal-
exclusivity rule that has forced upon appraisal a function it is ill-suited
to perform.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the reform proposals dis-
cussed above are inconsistent with the purpose of appraisal outlined
in this article. For instance, eliminating the market out will result in
the application of appraisal rights in situations where the benefits from
appraisal are small in comparison to the costs.'" Similarly, altering the
traditional valuation rules and reforming appraisal's perfection proce-
dures could impair the effectiveness of appraisal as a check on value-
decreasing, risk-altering transactions for the reasons explored in Parts
11.13.3 and 6 above. Thus, although adopting Thompson's proposals
may make appraisal a more effective check on majority misconduct, it
will at the same time make appraisal a less effective check on risk-al-
tering transactions that make shareholders as a group worse off.
Thompson suggests that this trade-off is worth making because the
number of cases where appraisal functions as a check on majority
misconduct greatly exceeds the number of cases where appraisal rights
perform their traditional function of checking value-decreasing, risk-
altering transactions. But the choice between checking majority mis-
conduct, on the one hand, and value-decreasing, risk-altering transac-
tions, on the other, is a false one: if appraisal exclusivity is rejected (so
that shareholders remain free to challenge conflict of interest transac-
I " This explains why so many of the modern appraisal cases involve minority cash-outs, even
though whim ity shareholders would clearly prefer to bring a shareholders' derivative suit alleging
breach of fiduciary duty. For a discussion of why the appraisal remedy should not be exclusive,
see supra Pan 11.B.5.
109 See supra Part 11.13.2 and notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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dons like cash-out mergers on fiduciary duty grounds), we can achieve
both objectives at the same time.
The analysis in this article thus suggests a very different approach
to reform from that taken by Thompson and others. The principal
components of this approach include:
1. Retaining and Expanding the Market Out. Instead of eliminating
or restricting the market out, as Thompson and others suggest, the
market out should (subject to the one caveat noted below) be retained
and expanded as securities markets more closely approach perfection.
As the analysis in Part II suggests, when securities markets more closely
approach perfection, the gains from appraisal become small in com-
parison to the costs. This suggests a market out for widely traded
shares, such as those traded on the national securities exchanges and
those held of record by a sufficient number of holders to produce an
active trading market. It also suggests extending the market out to the
principal over-the-counter markets (such as the NASDAQ Stock Mar-
ket) as those markets become more efficient. There is, however, one
caveat to this analysis: although the fact that a share trades in a well-
developed securities market generally equates with effective share-
holder access to capital markets, that will not always be the case. For
instance, shareholders holding large blocks of stock may be effectively
precluded from selling their stakes by the size of their holding, while
insiders and others holding "restricted stock" may be precluded from
selling all, or at least some, of their shares by the federal securities laws.
The preference reconciliation theory of appraisal suggests that, for
such shareholders, the desirability of a risk-altering transaction will de-
pend on their personal preferences for risk. Accordingly, when share-
holders hold widely traded stock but are effectively precluded from
selling that stock by either the size of their holdings or the federal
securities laws, appraisal rights should be restored.
2. Eliminating the Cash
-Out Exception to the Market Out. The cash-
out exception to the market out, introduced in Delaware in 1967,
should be replaced with a general provision making appraisal rights
unavailable whenever the consideration offered to shareholders takes
the form of cash. As explained earlier, the value of cash is independent
of an individual investor's personal taste for risk, so the value of the
consideration received in a cash-out transaction will not vary from
investor to investor. Accordingly, under the preference reconciliation
theory, appraisal has no role to play. 200
 As Thompson's analysis makes
2(14)
 For a discussion of why appraisal statutes were originally adopted without a general
exception for cash-out transactions, see supra note 142.
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clear, excluding cash-out transactions from appraisal will, of course,
dramatically reduce the number of future appraisal cases. 20I But the
success of a remedy should not be measured by the number of times
it is implemented, but rather by how well it achieves its objectives.
3. Rejecting Valuation Rules that Include Gains Attributable to the
Triggering Transaction; Applying Minority Discounts; Rejecting Discounts
for Illiquidity. Traditional valuation rules requiring shareholders who
elect appraisal to accept the pre-transaction value of their shares
should be retained (or, for those jurisdictions that have departed from
the traditional standard, restored). For the reasons explained in Part
ILB.3, standards of valuation that give objectors more than the pre-
transaction value of their shares can inhibit value-increasing transac-
tions. In addition, the "fair value" of a firm's shares, for appraisal
purposes, should be computed by discounting the firm's value to
reflect an objecting shareholder's minority interest. This result follows
because the purpose of appraisal is fully served by putting objecting
shareholders in the positions they would have occupied had the trig-
gering transaction not taken place. Giving minority shareholders the
value of a minority interest accomplishes this objective. 202 At the same
tune, a discount for illiquidity is inconsistent with the purposes of
appraisal. Under the preference reconciliation theory, the purpose of
appraisal is to put the costs of accessing capital markets on the firm,
not on the shareholders. Therefore, forcing objecting shareholders to
bear the costs of accessing capital markets by applying an illiquidity
discount to the pre-transaction value of their shares plainly conflicts
with the remedy.
4. Rejecting Appraisal-Exclusivity and Retaining Basic Perfection Pro-
cedures. Finally, for the reasons discussed in Parts II.B.5 and 6, the
MI See supra note 175 and accompanying text (noting that 80% of reported appraisal cases
since 1984 involve cash-out transactions).
2"Thompson endorses the opposite view, reasoning that "[o]nly 	 . [by excluding a dis-
count] can minority stockholders be assured that insiders in control of a company, burdened by
conflicting interests, may not purchase the enterprise at a price less than that obtainable in the
marketplace of qualified buyers and avoid paying a full and fair price to the minority." Thompson,
supra note 3, at 39 (quoting LINE Mass. Corp. v. Sims, 588 N.E.2d 14, 19 (Mass, App. Ct. 1992)).
This quotation, however, does not answer the argument that a majority shareholder should pay
less than a third party because the majority shareholder, unlike a third party, has already pur-
chased control. cf. Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 304-05 (Del. Ch. 1994) (holding that a
cash-out proposal by a controlling shareholder is fundamentally different than a merger proposal
from an unaffiliated third party because the "[controlling shareholder) already in fact had a
committed block of controlling stock;" thus, the court concluded, lilt is . . . quite possible that
the [conu oiling shareholder's] S24.75 [offer] may have been fair, even generous, while the $27.80
[third party offer] may be inadequate"). Despite this argument, a majority of courts hold that it
would be inappropriate to apply a minority discount. See Thompson, supra note 3, at 38.
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availability of an appraisal action should not preclude an action for
breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the same transaction.
Further, basic procedures, like pre-vote notification of an intention to
seek appraisal and the requirement that objectors vote "no" or abstain
from voting on the triggering transaction, should be retained.
CONCLUSION
Commentators have long sought to articulate a meaningful eco-
nomic function for appraisal. For the most part, however, these efforts
have fallen short. This article articulates a new theory of appraisal that
focuses on the ability of appraisal rights to reconcile differing share-
holder preferences with respect to transactions that alter the risk of a
firm's shares. Unlike previous efforts to explain appraisal, this theory
explains both the basic features of the remedy and the evolution of
the remedy over time, particularly the introduction and expansion of
the market out; it also carves out for appraisal a function that is distinct
from that served by other corporate law remedies. But perhaps more
significantly, this new theory of appraisal suggests a very different
future for the remedy—one that includes the continued expansion of
the market out, the rejection of appraisal exclusivity, and the elimina-
tion of the cash-out exception to the market out.
